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ARTICLE

IF YOU BUILD IT, THEY WILL COME: PRESERVING
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY IN THE FACE OF INDIAN
CASINOS AND THE NEW PREMIUM ON
TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP
by
*
Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne
This Article considers recent disputes over membership decisions made by
American Indian tribal governments. Since Congress passed the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988, Indian casinos have flourished on
some tribal reservations. Some argue that the new wealth brought by
casinos has increased fights over membership as tribes seek to expel
current members or refuse to admit new members. It is difficult to discern
whether there are more disputes over tribal enrollment as a consequence of
gaming or whether such disputes are now more public because gaming
has brought tribes to the forefront of U.S. culture. What is clear is that
enrollment disputes are receiving increased attention, resulting in calls
for some change to address what many perceive as a fundamental
unfairness in tribal decision making.
Aggrieved members’ attempts to resort to federal or state court are
blocked due to a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, standing, and
because of the tribes’ sovereign immunity. Activists and courts have
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. B.A., University of
Maryland, College Park, 1999; J.D., University of California, Davis, 2002. I would like
to thank Kirsten Netterblad for providing valuable feedback, which helped improve
this Article. Thanks also to Professor Linda D. Jellum for her insights. I would also
like to thank Mercer law students Emily Macheski-Preston, Kathleen S. Turnipseed,
Paul Chichester, and Heather J. Harlow who provided excellent research assistance.
Finally, I would like to thank the members and editors of the Lewis & Clark Law
Review for so skillfully shepherding this Article to publication. I appreciate the help,
support, and encouragement of all these people as well as the generous financial
assistance from the Mercer Law School. The mistakes are mine. Copyright © 2009 by
Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne.

311

312

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1

sought to change this, seeking to curtail the tribes’ sovereign immunity,
expand federal court jurisdiction to permit oversight, or otherwise impose
U.S. law on tribal membership decisions. Scholars are divided, with some
arguing for the abrogation of immunity or sovereignty, while others
argue that the tribes’ decisions are sacrosanct. Still others argue over how
the tribes should define membership—contending that it should be based
on cultural identity, political participation, blood quantity, or even
DNA.
This Article argues that the focus should instead be on solutions that
come from within the tribes. For too long the tribes have suffered from the
imposition of legal and cultural norms that do not reflect their identity or
culture. Because a tribe’s right to define its membership lies at the heart of
its sovereignty, the solution is more, not less, sovereignty for the tribes. To
remedy the impasse, I propose that tribes create separate independent
judicial bodies, or an intertribal appellate court that would provide
independent review of tribal membership decisions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2004, U.S. District Court Judge Lawrence Karlton blasted the
concept of tribal sovereign immunity in the face of a legal challenge to
the Table Mountain Rancheria’s refusal to admit four members to its
1
tribe. According to the court, the tribe would have no existence but for a
2
court ordering that it be recognized by the United States. Thus, it was
“bizarre” to suggest that the court had no role in adjudicating a
3
membership dispute. While the court nonetheless concluded that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it warned that if American Indian
tribes did not appear to act in good faith, a court would eventually decide
otherwise and permit federal involvement in tribal membership
4
decisions.

1
2
3
4

Jerry Bier, Nowhere to Turn, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 22, 2004, at A1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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At the center of the court’s outrage was the belief that the
5
membership dispute came down to a matter of greed. Namely, the
6
tribe’s desire to control and limit access to its lucrative gaming revenues.
This is a familiar charge made in nearly every case involving casinos and
tribal membership decisions.
Since Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in
7
8
1988, Indian casinos have flourished on some tribal reservations.
Members of tribes that operate successful casinos often receive thousands
9
of dollars in casino profits each month. Popular press accounts of tribal
membership conflicts suggest that disputes over membership are tied to
10
the tribes’ increased casino wealth. To the extent these conflicts are
11
about greed, it is surely implicated on both sides. Disputes over
membership involve both claims by individuals seeking access to a
12
portion of the gaming revenue pie, as well as efforts to exclude
members to ensure the pie is not divided up quite as much and each
13
member’s share thereby reduced.
5

See id.
See id.
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2006).
8
NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INDIAN GAMING IN 2006
(2006), available at http://www.indiangaming.org/info/pr/press-releases-2007/NIGA
_econ_impact_2006.pdf; Renee Ann Cramer, The Common Sense of Anti-Indian Racism:
Reactions to Mashantucket Pequot Success in Gaming and Acknowledgment, 31 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 313, 314 (2006); Eric Henderson, Indian Gaming: Social Consequences, 29 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 205, 206 (1997).
9
See Henderson, supra note 8, at 240–41; Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light,
Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and
Identity, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 402–03 (1997); see also Bier, supra note 1; Marc
Cooper, Tribal Flush: Pechanga People “Disenrolled” en Masse, LA WEEKLY, Jan. 3, 2008,
available at http://www.laweekly.com/2008-01-03/news/tribal-flush-pechanga-peopledisenrolled-en-masse; James May, State Capitol Rally Protests Disenrollments, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, July 16, 2004, available at http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/
archive/28212274.html; Onell R. Soto, Tribe Denies 50 Members Profits from Casino: San
Pasqual Band Says Some Lack Indian Blood, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 28, 2008, at
A1.
10
See, e.g., Bier, supra note 1; Cooper, supra note 9; Danna Harman, Gambling on
Tribal Ancestry, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 12, 2004, at 15; Michael Hiltzik, Fairness
Is the Loser in Tribal Identity Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2004, at 1; Michael Martinez,
Indians Decry Banishment by Their Tribes: Protesters Say Power Struggles, Mainly over Casinos,
Have Stripped Them of Gaming Profits, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 2006, at 9; May, supra note 9;
Andrew Metz, Identity Crisis: Survival of Tribes at Stake as Strict Rules Weed Out Members,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 21, 2003, at A7; Soto, supra note 9, at A1; Steve Young, Woman Fights to
Stay in Tribe, ARGUS LEADER, Apr. 9, 2000, at 1A.
11
Henderson, supra note 8, at 241–42 (discussing membership disputes and how
gaming revenue affects all parties’ motivations).
12
See Harman, supra note 10 (noting increase from approximately 15 to 30
membership enrollment requests per year prior to gaming to more than 450 after
Pechanga tribe opened lucrative casino); David Kelley, Clan Says Tribe Dealt It a Bad
Hand—A Family Finds Itself Cut Off from the Pechanga Group and Its Casino Wealth Despite
Long Ties to the Reservation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at 1.
13
See May, supra note 9 (noting American Indian Movement organizer’s opinion
that the “per-capita system in which gaming tribes carve up a proportion of their
6
7
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It is difficult to discern whether there are more disputes over tribal
enrollment as a consequence of gaming, or whether such disputes are
now more public because gaming has brought tribes to the forefront of
14
U.S. culture. Ultimately, the answer may not matter. In either event, as
enrollment disputes receive more attention, there will be increasing calls
for some change to address what many perceive as a fundamental
15
unfairness in tribal membership decision making. To the extent the
issue is about perception, it is this perception that is spurring cries for
reform as the parties try to press their claims in federal court.
The resulting membership lawsuits typically involve passionate and
heartfelt claims to tribal identity, with each side claiming the right to
16
define what that identity entails. Thus, Judge Karlton’s complaints are
perhaps understandable. Ultimately, however, these heated debates are
resolved through the bloodless rules of federal subject matter
17
jurisdiction, standing, and sovereign immunity. Simply put, the courts
routinely find that they have no role in deciding tribal membership
disputes.
Upset by the seeming unfairness to the excluded members, some
activists and courts have begun to call for change to curtail the tribes’
sovereign immunity, to expand federal court jurisdiction to permit
oversight, or to otherwise impose U.S. law on tribal membership

profits to pay to tribal members from their gaming establishments” caused the
majority of disenrollment efforts to ensure a “bigger piece of monetary pie for the
remaining members”); Jodi Rave, Loss of Tribal Membership a Contentious Issue,
BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 8, 2005, available at http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/
local/article_869c7ca5-1778-544e-962d-c3a3a9fc7cd4.html.
14
See Angela R. Riley, Tribal Sovereignty in a Post-9/11 World, 82 N.D. L. REV. 953,
954, 960–61 (2006). This increased awareness of Indian tribes is itself a consequence
of tribal gaming as tribal casinos bring more non-Indians onto reservations and in
contact with tribes.
15
See id. at 959–60; see also Bier, supra note 1; Cooper, supra note 9; Harman,
supra note 10; Hiltzik, supra note 10,; Martinez, supra note 10; May, supra note 9; Jodi
Rave, Debate Heats Up as Tribes Cut Members, MISSOULIAN, Oct. 9, 2005,
http://www.missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/article_38e0a53f-de74-593bad52-bc59f5908116.html; Metz, supra note 10; Soto, supra note 9; Young, supra note
10.
16
See, e.g., Williams v. Gover, 490 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2007); Alvarado v. Table
Mountain Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2007); Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959
(9th Cir. 2005); Arviso v. Norton, 129 F. App’x 391 (9th Cir. 2005); Ordinance 59
Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Sec’y, 163 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 1998); Akins v.
Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482 (1st Cir. 1997); Hendrix v. Coffey, No. CIV-08-605-M,
2008 WL 2740901 (W.D. Okla. July 10, 2008); St. Pierre v. Norton, 498 F. Supp. 2d
214 (D.D.C. 2007); Rosales v. United States, 477 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007); Quair
v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
17
See, e.g., Williams, 490 F.3d 785; Alvarado, 509 F.3d 1008; Lewis, 424 F.3d 959;
Arviso, 129 F. App’x 391; Ordinance 59 Ass’n, 163 F.3d 1150; Akins, 130 F.3d 482;
Hendrix, 2008 WL 2740901; St. Pierre, 498 F. Supp. 2d 214; Rosales, 477 F. Supp. 2d
119; Quair, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948.
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18

decisions. Solutions range from abrogating sovereignty by permitting
federal involvement over membership disputes to instilling a more
standardized method for determining membership, such as by cultural
19
identity, political participation, blood quantum, or DNA identification.
In this Article, I argue that the focus should instead be on solutions
20
that come from within the tribe. For too long the tribes have suffered
from the imposition of legal and cultural norms that do not reflect their
21
identity or culture. Part II discusses the development of Indian gaming
22
and the effect of IGRA on tribal finances and membership. Part III
describes two typical tribal membership disputes that arose in California
23
and were litigated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Part IV discusses proposed solutions to the problem of tribal membership
disputes and how these solutions would undermine tribal sovereignty or
24
identity. Part V proposes instead that the solution depends on more,
not less, sovereignty for the tribes. Instead of federal intervention or
resorting to DNA, I propose that tribes create separate independent
judicial bodies, or an intertribal appellate court, to review membership
determinations. The creation of a judicial body with independent
oversight would reconcile the seemingly competing goals of ensuring
tribal autonomy while also providing tribal members and potential
members with an impartial decision maker.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)
In 1988, Congress opened the casino doors on Indian reservations
25
with the passage of IGRA. In passing IGRA, Congress was responding to

18

See May, supra note 9; Rave, supra note 15; see also Lewis, 424 F.3d 959; Arviso,
129 F. App’x 391.
19
See generally Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements
for Indian Nations, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 437 (2002); Carla D. Pratt, Tribal Kulturkampf:
The Role of Race Ideology in Constructing Native American Identity, 35 SETON HALL L. REV.
1241, 1259 (2005); see also Eric Beckenhauer, Note, Redefining Race: Can Genetic Testing
Provide Biological Proof of Indian Ethnicity?, 56 STAN. L. REV. 161 (2003); Eric Reitman,
Note, An Argument for the Partial Abrogation of Federally Recognized Indian Tribes’ Sovereign
Power over Membership, 92 VA. L. REV. 793, 863 (2006) (arguing that “Congress should
exercise its power over federally recognized Indian tribes and abrogate, at least in
part, tribal citizenship power”).
20
See infra Part V.
21
See generally Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back:
How the “Existing Indian Family” Exception (Re)imposes Anglo American Legal Values on
American Indian Tribes to the Detriment of Cultural Autonomy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329
(2009).
22
See infra Part II.
23
See infra Part III.
24
See infra Part IV.
25
See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2006).
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gaming that was already taking place on Indian reservations but that was
26
not being regulated (by state governments at least).
27
While many view Indian gaming as an economic boon to tribes,
others decry gaming as anathema to tribal values and an unstable basis
28
on which to build tribal economies. Moreover, critics charge that IGRA
undercuts tribal sovereignty by permitting states to interfere with tribal
29
governance. There is truth in the latter charge. The driving force
behind passage of IGRA was state concern with unregulated Indian
gaming as well as regulated gaming that would compete with non-Indian
30
gaming operations. Consequently, IGRA permits some state regulation
31
of some types of gaming on Indian reservations. Nevertheless,
Congress’s stated goal was to “promote tribal economic development,
32
tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government.”
To reconcile these competing interests, Congress divided gaming
33
into three separate classes. Jurisdiction to regulate gaming, and the
extent to which state governments could be involved, would depend on
the type of gaming involved. Tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over Class
I gaming, or those social games typically associated with traditional tribal
34
celebrations. As long as state law permits Class II gaming, defined as
games of chance such as bingo or certain card games, tribes may also
35
operate such games free from state interference.
All other gaming that is not classified as Class I or Class II gaming is
36
considered Class III gaming. Class III games are those typically
associated with casinos, such as slot machines and “banked” card games.
To operate a Class III gaming facility, the state where the tribe is located
37
must permit such gaming. Further, the tribe must adopt an ordinance
permitting gaming that is approved by the chairman of the National
38
Indian Gaming Commission. Last, but certainly not least, the tribe and
state must enter into a gaming compact that will govern the gaming
39
activities.

26

Rand & Light, supra note 9, at 382.
Id. at 402–03.
28
Id. at 382–83.
29
See Robert Odawi Porter, Tribal Disobedience, 11 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 137, 167–68
(2006).
30
Rand & Light, supra note 9, at 400.
31
See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1998, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2006).
32
Id. § 2701(4); Rand & Light, supra note 9, at 399.
33
See 25 U.S.C. § 2703.
34
Id. §§ 2703(6), 2710(a)(1).
35
Id. §§ 2703(7), 2710(b)(1)(A).
36
Id. § 2703(8).
37
Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
38
Id. § 2710(d)(1)(A)(iii).
39
Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C). IGRA mandates that states negotiate tribal-state compacts
in good faith upon the tribe’s request to enter into a compact. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
27
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IGRA requires that profits from gaming be used for the benefit of
40
the tribe itself. Specifically, IGRA mandates that profits may not be used
for any purpose other than funding tribal government services, providing
for the tribe’s general welfare, promoting economic and community
development, donations to charitable organizations, and aiding local
41
governments. Only after those expenditures may the tribe seek to make
42
per capita payments to tribal members from gaming revenues. To do
that, the tribe must prepare and submit a plan for per capita
43
distributions for approval to the Secretary of the Interior. It is these
expenditures, many critics allege, that are at the root of tribal enrollment
44
disputes.
B. Effect of IGRA Gaming on Tribal Economies
Although tribal gaming existed before Congress passed IGRA in
45
1988, there is no question that IGRA changed the face of Indian gaming
46
and the economic prospects of many Indian tribes. For many tribes,
casinos have been a boon. Casinos have brought jobs to native
47
communities. Gaming revenue has helped fund needed government
48
and social services and has provided for schools and scholarships.
At the time of IGRA’s passage, Indian gaming generated revenues of
49
approximately $200 million per year. Nearly twenty years later, that
number had increased dramatically. Indeed, by 2007 gaming generated
50
$26 billion in revenues from 382 gaming tribes. This represents a five
51
percent increase over the previous year.
Tribal gaming has especially thrived in California, where the Table
52
Mountain Rancheria, the tribe at issue in Lewis, is located. In the last
two years, Indian casinos in California generated approximately $8
billion in gaming revenue, constituting nearly thirty percent of all
53
gaming revenue. In the year the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Lewis’s
40

Id. § 2710(b)(2)(B).
Id.
Id. § 2710(b)(3); see also Ross v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, 809 F. Supp.
738, 742–43 (D.S.D. 1992).
43
25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3).
44
See Henderson, supra note 8, at 241–42.
45
Rand & Light, supra note 9, at 396–97; see generally Henderson, supra note 8.
46
Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust Obligation to
American Indians, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 105–08 (2004).
47
Press Release, National Indian Gaming Commission, NIGC Announces 2007
Indian Gaming Revenues, (June 18, 2008), http://www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/
PressReleases/PressReleasesMain/PR93062008/tabid/841/Default.aspx.
48
NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 8, at 10.
49
Press Release, supra note 47.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2005).
53
Howard Stutz, Tribal Casinos Feeling Pinch, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 19, 2008, at
1D; see Kate Coe, Propositions 94, 95, 96 & 97: Engorged with Money, Four Tiny Tribes
41
42
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appeal, the Table Mountain Rancheria brought in $100 million from its
54
casino.
It is undeniable that gaming enterprises have brought many tribes
their first prospects for economic self-determination in over two hundred
55
years. In fact, for many tribes, casino revenue constitutes the bulk of the
average tribal budget, and in some cases far exceeds federal aid or
56
revenue from other sources. Gaming revenue contributes directly to the
57
economic development of reservations. Under IGRA, tribes are
required either to use gaming revenue for public purposes or to
58
distribute the proceeds to tribal members on a per capita basis.
Spend a King’s Ransom to Get More, LA WEEKLY, Jan. 31, 2008, available at
http://www.laweekly.com/2008-01-31/news/propositions-94-95-96-97.
54
See Jerry Bier, Indians’ Lawsuit Targets Rancheria, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 30, 2005, at
B1.
55
See NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 8, at 5; Kelley, supra note 12, at 1;
McCarthy, supra note 46, at 105–07; see also Heidi L. McNeil, Indian Gaming in Arizona:
The Great Casino Controversy Continues, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Jan. 1998, at 13, 35. However, it is
equally true that gaming has not benefited all tribes equally. See McCarthy, supra note
46, at 106. Of 564 federally recognized tribes, only 225 operated casinos as of 2006.
NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 8, at 1; Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.bia.gov/biaSearch/cached.jsp;jsessionid=
58c9f55bee8f23fe90d9f73b5b6d61a4699143b9833d0ddadcfbba0768e72a9a?id=495&q
=number+of+tribes. For some tribes, this was a decision driven by the tribe’s
particular cultural or religious beliefs. Daniel Twetten, Comment, Public Law 280 and
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Could Two Wrongs Ever Be Made into a Right?, 90 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1317, 1345 (2000); see also Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang
Fikentscher, American Indian Law Codes: Pragmatic Law and Tribal Identity, 56 AM. J.
COMP. L. 29, 53 (2008). For other tribes the decision was more economic after the
tribe concluded that casino operations would not be successful due to the remoteness
of the tribe’s reservation land. Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Bonds: Statutory Shackles and
Regulatory Restraints on Tribal Economic Development, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1009, 1012–13
(2007). Moreover, even within gaming tribes, not all benefit to the same degree.
Some tribes have operated casinos at a loss or have closed financially failing casinos.
Id. at 1012 & n.11 (“Additionally, not all gambling facilities are successful. Some
tribes operate their casinos at a loss and a few have even been forced to close moneylosing facilities.” (quoting NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, 106TH CONG.,
FINAL REPORT 2-10 (Comm. Print 1999), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
ngisc/reports/2.pdf)). Of those tribes that do operate casinos, only a small number
generate the lion’s share of revenue. See id. at 1012; Coe, supra note 53 (reporting that
“much of the wealth [from California’s Indian casinos] flows to a tiny group of Native
Americans among the state’s 108 federally recognized tribes”). Indeed, the top twenty
casinos generate more than half of all gaming revenue. Clarkson, supra, at 1012 n.11
(“[The] 20 largest Indian gambling facilities account for 50.5 percent of total
revenues, with the next 85 accounting for [only] 41.2 percent.” (quoting NAT’L
GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra)). Of California’s 108 tribes, only a handful
bring in the bulk of that state’s nearly $8 billion in gaming revenue. Coe, supra note
53.
56
Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 55, at 53; see Mike Gallagher, Gaming Tribes
Cash In, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 2, 2005, at A6.
57
See NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 8, at 8–25; McCarthy, supra note 46,
at 105–06; see also Kelley, supra note 12 (describing rampant poverty on reservation
before tribe started casino operations).
58
See McCarthy, supra note 46, at 105.
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Typically, tribes have used the profits from gaming to build schools,
construct roads, finance scholarships, and make other community
59
investments.
Gaming has also had more intangible benefits. For instance, gaming
and casino development have helped foster connections between the
60
tribes and other businesses. Gaming revenues have supported cultural
programs viewed as vital to preserving and protecting Indian culture for
61
future generations. The Mohegan Tribe in Connecticut used gaming
62
revenue to purchase land containing the tribe’s burial grounds. Other
tribes have contributed to the preservation of Indian basket weaving and
63
languages as well as the creation of cultural centers and museums.
Money not used for tribal services is distributed in monthly or
annual distributions to tribal members. For individual members, gaming
distributions can mean the difference between a life of poverty and one
64
of unimagined wealth. For instance, in 2002, each enrolled tribal
member in the Table Mountain Rancheria received a $200,000 annual
65
bonus in addition to a monthly distribution of $15,000. By 2008, some
tribal members in California received $30,000 a month in casino
66
distributions. Further, ousted members lose out on other tribal benefits
67
such as education and healthcare services.
Given these figures, it is perhaps understandable why those who
believe they are tribal members would want to ensure their membership
is recognized and that they are accepted into the tribe. It is equally
understandable why currently enrolled members would want to exclude
newcomers. Not only do members receive casino revenue distributions,
but as tribes have become wealthier they have been able to provide better
services to their members in things like school clothing, vocational
68
training, eldercare, etc. Each additional member decreases the current
members’ revenue distributions and increases the tribe’s cost of
59

Id.; NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 8, at 8–26.
See Joe Lyons, The Man in Charge of a Fantasy, INLAND EMPIRE BUS. J., Mar. 2007,
at 11 (discussing Cabazon’s casino which included several restaurants, a Starbucks,
and Pizza Kitchen); see also James May, San Manuel Looks to Diversify, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY, May 11, 2005, available at http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/archive/
28165674.html.
61
NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 8, at 13.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See Coe, supra note 53; Kelley, supra note 12; Cooper, supra note 9.
65
Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfortune, TIME, Dec. 16, 2002, at
44, 47.
66
See Coe, supra note 53.
67
See Jason B. Johnson, Former Pomo Leader Expelled from Tribe, S.F. CHRON., May 1,
2006, at B1 (describing ousted members’ loss of scholarships and right to vote in
tribal elections); Kelley, supra note 12 (describing loss of gaming revenue, tribal
health insurance, and schooling); Rave, supra note 13 (“Not only did they lose their
tribal identity, the family also lost education, health and other citizenship benefits,
including a monthly casino per-capita payment amounting to about $2,500.”).
68
See NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 8, at 2, 8–26.
60
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providing these government and social services. Thus, while many
American Indians living outside of tribal reservations may now have an
additional incentive to return to reservation life, in order for tribes to
maintain economic development by means of gaming enterprises they
may feel pressured to constrain population growth to be able to continue
69
to provide these services.
Consequently, the success of tribal gaming enterprises has the
potential to alter the way that tribes view themselves in relation to both
non-Indians and other tribes, producing or reinforcing a narrow,
70
exclusive conception of tribal identity. As a way to narrow tribal
enrollment, some tribes have turned to restrictive, race-based
conceptions of tribal citizenship, and blood quantum has become proxy
71
for tribal identity. Seeking to vindicate their claim to membership, tribal
72
members and potential members have resorted to legal action.
III. MEMBERSHIP CONTROVERSIES
In the past eight years, Indian tribes in California have removed five
73
thousand people from their membership rolls. According to the tribes,
these disenrollments were necessary to correct longstanding mistakes in
74
membership rolls. For the individuals affected, however, disenrollment
from their tribe can mean the division of family and separation from
75
their tribe and culture. It can also mean unemployment, the loss of
their homes, and the loss of a share in the revenues generated by the
billion-dollar Indian casino industry.
Contesting these decisions, disaffected members and those excluded
from membership have filed suit in both state and federal courts to
contest tribal membership decisions. In some cases, individuals seeking
to become enrolled members of the tribes sue when their applications
76
are denied. In others, currently enrolled members sue when they are

69

See Cooper, supra note 9.
See Hiltzik, supra note 10.
71
See Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935,
51 S.D. L. REV. 1 (2006). See, e.g., Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 167–72 (discussing
tribal uses of blood quantum requirements); Goldberg, supra note 19, at 459–71
(discussing use of blood quanta as membership criteria); Mark Neath, American
Indian Gaming Enterprises and Tribal Membership: Race, Exclusivity, and a Perilous Future, 2
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 689, 698 (1995).
72
See, e.g., Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2005); Arviso v. Norton, 129 F.
App’x 391 (9th Cir. 2005).
73
Kevin Fagan, Tribes Toss Out Members In High-Stakes Quarrel, S.F. CHRON., Apr.
20, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/
04/20/MNJNVJC72.DTL.
74
See id. (“The council explains it as a readjustment of records to more
accurately reflect who deserves to be a Picayune Chukchansi and an official member
of the tribe.”).
75
Cooper, supra note 9; Kelley, supra note 12.
76
See Riley, supra note 14, at 960.
70

2010]

IF YOU BUILD IT, THEY WILL COME

321

77

suddenly disenrolled from the tribe. And, in a third category of cases,
members seek to exclude already enrolled members and sue when the
78
tribe refuses to act.
In April 2005, a Ninth Circuit panel heard two cases involving
79
disputes over tribal membership. Though they involved different tribes
and different claims, the cases were really two sides of same coin in that
they both represented efforts to force federal agencies to become
involved in a tribal membership dispute. In one suit, the plaintiffs sought
to exclude certain members from the tribe on the ground that they did
80
not meet enrollment criteria. In the other, the plaintiffs sought to
become enrolled members of a tribe that had thus far failed to act on
81
their enrollment applications. Both cases were resolved on the same
82
point—lack of federal standing and jurisdiction.
The first case, Arviso v. Norton, involved what the district court
characterized as a “bitter intra tribal dispute” concerning whether certain
members of the Rincon Band of San Luiseño Indians (Band) properly
83
met the blood quantum requirements for tribal membership.
Underlying the dispute was a judgment of funds awarded to the Band in
84
1987 under U.S. Court of Claims Docket No. 80-A. Only those
applicants meeting the enrollment criteria would receive a distribution of
85
the funds.
The plaintiffs, all members of the Band, alleged that seventy-two
people who were not eligible for membership in the Band were
nonetheless enrolled members because of the improper actions and
omissions of the Secretary of the Interior and officials of the Bureau of
86
Indian Affairs (BIA). Specifically, plaintiffs complained that the
Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs violated the law by
ordering BIA officials to cease further administrative proceedings
87
involving the membership of the disputed members. According to the
plaintiffs, the federal defendants had breached their trust obligations
and fiduciary duties, as well as their obligations under federal and tribal
88
law regarding membership.

77
See, e.g., Salinas v. Barron, No. RIC427295, 2008 WL 699205, at *2 (Cal. Ct.
App. March 17, 2008); Lamere v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880, 881 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005); Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
78
See, e.g., Arviso v. Norton, 129 F. App’x 391, 392 (9th Cir. 2005).
79
Id.; Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959, 960 (9th Cir. 2005).
80
Arviso, 129 F. App’x at 392.
81
Lewis, 424 F.3d at 961.
82
Arviso, 129 F. App’x at 392; Lewis, 424 F.3d at 960.
83
Answering Brief for the Federal Defendants-Appellees at 5, 20, Arviso, 129 F.
App’x 391 (No. 03-56893).
84
Id. at 4.
85
25 U.S.C. § 163 (2006).
86
Arviso, 129 F. App’x at 392.
87
Appellants’ Opening Brief at 5, Arviso, 129 F. App’x 391 (No. 03-56893).
88
Id.
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As a consequence of the defendants’ inaction, plaintiffs had been
deprived of their right to a fair election because persons who were not
eligible to vote would be permitted to vote in future tribal elections,
89
thereby diluting the plaintiffs’ votes. Other injuries complained of
included (1) the failure of the tribe to act on one plaintiff’s application
to enroll his two children as tribal members; (2) the tribe’s denial of one
plaintiff’s application for tribal housing; and (3) a third plaintiff’s defeat
in a tribal election as a consequence of the disputed members being
90
permitted to vote.
To remedy these perceived wrongs, plaintiffs sought declaratory and
injunctive relief that would recognize the BIA’s failure to take any
administrative action with respect to the membership of the disputed
91
members. They also sought to prohibit the BIA from failing to take such
administrative action in the future as purportedly required by federal
92
regulations and tribal law.
The Band intervened and moved to dismiss on the ground that it was
93
a necessary and indispensable party to the suit. Before the hearing on
the Band’s motion, the plaintiffs and federal defendants entered into a
94
Settlement Agreement. Under the Agreement, the BIA would withdraw
certain decision letters issued by the Assistant Secretary and reconsider
earlier protests to prior enrollment decisions, including reconsideration
95
of correction to the Band’s Base Roll. It further required that the BIA
would base enrollment decisions on the disputed members’ common
96
ancestor having a blood quantum of three-quarters. The BIA would
then issue a determination of eligibility for enrollment that would be
97
appealable to the BIA. The names of ineligible members would be
98
stricken from the Band’s Roll.
The district court entered judgment on the Settlement Agreement
99
before considering the Band’s motion to intervene. It then stayed
enforcement of the Agreement and later permitted the Band to

89

Arviso, 129 F. App’x at 392–93.
Id. at 393 n.1.
91
Id. at 393.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 392.
94
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 87, at 6; Answering Brief for the Federal
Defendants-Appellees, supra note 83, at 2–3.
95
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 87, at 24–25; Answering Brief for the
Federal Defendants-Appellees, supra note 83, at 16–17.
96
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 87, at 14–15, 23–25; Answering Brief for
the Federal Defendants-Appellees, supra note 83, at 16–17.
97
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 87, at 26; Answering Brief for the
Federal Defendants-Appellees, supra note 83, at 17.
98
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 87, at 23. See Answering Brief for the
Federal Defendants-Appellees, supra note 83, at 16–17.
99
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 87, at 2–3; Answering Brief for the
Federal Defendants-Appellees, supra note 83, at 3, 17.
90
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100

intervene. Afterwards, the Band moved to vacate the judgment and to
dismiss on the grounds that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction and that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, the Band
101
was an indispensable party. Finding for the Band, the district court
deemed it a necessary and indispensable party, and dismissed plaintiffs’
suit because the Band’s sovereign status precluded it from being
102
joined.
Although the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the
Band was an indispensable party, it concluded that the plaintiffs’ suit was
103
According to the circuit court, the
more fundamentally flawed.
plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claims because the federal courts
104
would be unable to fashion any relief to redress any perceived injury. In
reaching this conclusion, the court first disposed of all the plaintiffs’
claimed injuries save the vote dilution claim on the ground that plaintiffs
could not establish that the alleged injuries were caused by any action or
105
inaction by the federal defendants.
Finding the vote dilution claim “marginally traceable” to the actions
of the defendants, the court nonetheless concluded that the federal
court could not grant the plaintiffs any relief even if it were to find in
106
plaintiffs’ favor. According to the court, the plaintiffs’ claim necessarily
failed because “any relief fashioned by the district court—either
enforcement of the Settlement Agreement or an order directing the BIA
to reconsider the enrollment of the disputed individuals—directly
implicates the Band’s sovereign right to determine its own membership
107
and enrollment procedures.” Ultimately, “the district court ha[d] no
authority to order any relief favorable to Plaintiffs’ complaint because,
any such relief would impermissibly impair the Band’s sovereign right to
108
determine its membership.” Because there could be no redress for
109
their complained of wrongs, plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.
It was the second case, Lewis v. Norton, that was particularly troubling
110
to the Ninth Circuit panel and that raised the district court’s ire. In
Lewis, the plaintiffs were four siblings and the children of an enrolled

100
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 87, at 7; Answering Brief for the
Federal Defendants-Appellees, supra note 83 at 18.
101
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 87, at 6–7; Answering Brief for the
Federal Defendants-Appellees, supra note 83 at 17.
102
Arviso v. Norton, 129 F. App’x 391, 392 (9th Cir. 2005).
103
Id.
104
Id. at 393.
105
Id. at 393 n.1.
106
Id. at 392.
107
Id. at 393.
108
Id. at 394.
109
Id.
110
Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2005). See Bier, supra note 1.
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111

member of the Table Mountain Rancheria. The plaintiffs had all grown
up in a shack on the reservation, but had left the reservation to seek
112
employment elsewhere because of the economic impoverishment. After
the tribe’s fortunes changed with passage of IGRA and the development
113
of a lucrative casino, plaintiffs sought to return to the reservation. They
114
were not exactly welcomed with open arms. Instead, the tribe refused
115
to act on their membership applications. Indeed, for the five years after
plaintiffs first attempted to enroll in the tribe, the Rancheria had taken
116
no action on their membership applications.
Plaintiffs complained that they were entitled to recognition as
members of the tribe because they were lineal descendants of tribal
members and had the requisite one-quarter blood quantum for
117
membership. Tribal membership in the Rancheria definitely had its
privileges. At the time of the suit, the Rancheria had seventy-four
members who each received tens of thousands of dollars per month in
118
Thus, the difference between membership and
gaming revenue.
exclusion was the difference between a life of luxury and one of
119
poverty. Plaintiffs contended that, as eligible members, they were
entitled to share in the revenue of the Rancheria’s very successful casino,
120
which brought in approximately $100 million per year.
Rather than sue the Rancheria, plaintiffs’ lawsuit targeted officials of
the BIA and the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the National
121
According to the plaintiffs,
Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC).
defendants had failed to comply with U.S. laws and regulations by
refusing to order the Rancheria to recognize all qualified individuals as
122
members. To remedy this, plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive
relief to require the BIA and DOI to act and to prevent the distribution
of government funds to the Rancheria until it complied with its
123
constitution and enrollment ordinance. Plaintiffs also sought to require
NIGC to prohibit the Rancheria from disbursing casino profits to its

111

Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Whose Tribe Is It, Anyway?, TIME, Dec. 16,
2002, at 57; Brian Melley, Coalition Plans Tribal Takeover, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug.
1, 2000, at 3B.
112
Barlett & Steele, supra note 111, at 57; Melley, supra note 111.
113
Barlett & Steele, supra note 111, at 57.
114
Id.; Melley, supra note 111; see also Lewis, 424 F.3d at 961.
115
Barlett & Steele, supra note 111, at 57; Melley, supra note 111; see also Lewis,
424 F.3d at 961.
116
Lewis, 424 F.3d at 961.
117
Id. at 960–61.
118
See Brief for Appellants at 12, Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2005)
(No. 03-17207); Barlett & Steele, supra note 111 at 57; Melley, supra note 111.
119
See Barlett & Steele, supra note 111, at 57; Melley, supra note 111.
120
Barlett & Steele, supra note 111 at 57; see also Brief for Appellants, supra note
118, at 12; Melley, supra note 111.
121
Lewis, 424 F.3d at 960.
122
Id. at 961.
123
Id.
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124

members until it recognized appellants as enrolled members. The
district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
125
jurisdiction.
Although its decision upheld tribal sovereignty, the district court was
clearly incensed. During oral arguments on the Rancheria’s motion,
Judge Karlton blasted the Rancheria:
You know, all of this is just sort of extraordinary. The only reason
this Rancheria has whatever it is, 30 millionaires and 20
impoverished people is because of a court order which ordered the
United States to reinstate the rancheria. So I mean the argument
that the court has no place in this dispute is bizarre. But for the fact
that a court ordered the United States to reinstate the rancheria,
126
nobody would have a dime. I mean, this is just disgraceful.
To the district court, the problem was clear: the tribe was being
127
Thus, the solution was equally clear: court
unfair and greedy.
intervention. As the court explained, “You know, somebody ought to
warn the tribe this is the kind of facts where some court is going to say
128
‘we’re outraged’ and put it to them.”
129
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.
In so doing, the court determined that dismissal of the siblings’ claim was
warranted due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the dispute
involved an internal tribal matter that the court lacked power to
130
adjudicate. First, tribal immunity barred suit against the tribe to force
131
the tribe to comply with its membership provisions. Nor could the
plaintiffs avoid tribal immunity and sovereignty by suing federal
132
agencies. Because only the tribe possessed the authority to determine
its membership, a federal court order compelling federal-agency action
133
could not force the tribe to enroll the disputed members. Further, a
tribal remedy existed for plaintiffs’ claims because the tribal council and
the general council were not inadequate merely because they had not
134
granted the siblings membership.
Finally, the court held that IGRA and related regulations did not act
to waive the tribe’s sovereign immunity over an intra-tribal membership
124

Id.
Id.
126
Brief for Appellants, supra note 118, at 3–4.
127
See id.
128
Id. at 3.
129
Lewis, 424 F.3d at 960.
130
Id. at 961–62.
131
Id. at 962. The court also held that the tribe’s waiver of sovereign immunity in
1983 to obtain federal recognition of the tribe and its membership roll did not
constitute a waiver of the tribe’s sovereign immunity in perpetuity for the resolution
of all claims to tribal membership. Id.
132
Id. at 963.
133
Id. (citing Ordinance 59 Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Sec’y, 163 F.3d
1150, 1160 (10th Cir. 1998)).
134
Id. at 962.
125
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135

dispute. The court explicitly rejected plaintiffs’ argument that IGRA
conferred jurisdiction over tribal membership by granting the
136
government oversight over distribution of gaming revenues. Instead,
the court concluded that nothing in IGRA provides federal government
137
oversight of membership issues. In fact, the regulations promulgated
under IGRA state that allocation and distribution of revenue is to be
138
decided by a tribal court or administrative processes.
In addition to affirming the district court’s dismissal, the appeals
139
court shared the district court’s frustration. Based on the appellate
record, it was clear to the court that the plaintiffs met the tribe’s own
140
stated membership criteria. Despite that, the tribe had refused to act
on their applications, effectively denying them membership and a
141
portion of tribal gaming revenue. For the panel, the solution seemed
clear: it was time to revisit the wisdom of tribal sovereign immunity in
light of the new premium gaming revenues had placed on tribal
142
membership. Although straightforward, this proposed solution would
undo the fundamental notion of tribal sovereignty that permits the tribe
143
to determine its own membership. Because, unlike other U.S. citizens,
American Indians are also tribal citizens, the tribe has a parallel right to
144
sovereignty.
Nevertheless, concluding that the plaintiffs could not “survive the
double jurisdictional whammy of sovereign immunity and lack of federal
court jurisdiction to intervene in tribal membership disputes,” the Lewis
panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
145
jurisdiction. The attempt to sue federal agencies instead of the tribe
146
was not a way around these jurisdictional roadblocks.
The panel responded to the seeming unfairness of the plaintiffs’
plight by concluding its opinion with this plea:
These doctrines of tribal sovereign immunity were developed
decades ago, before the gaming boom created a new and
economically valuable premium on tribal membership. . . . We
agree with the district court’s conclusion that this case is deeply
troubling on the level of fundamental substantive justice.
Nevertheless, we are not in a position to modify well-settled

135

Id. at 962–63.
Id. at 963.
137
Id. at 962–63.
138
25 C.F.R. § 290.23 (2009); 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3); see Lewis, 424 F.3d at 963.
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Lewis, 424 F.3d at 960, 963.
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Id. at 960.
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Id. at 961.
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See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978).
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doctrines of tribal sovereign immunity. This is a matter in the hands
147
of a higher authority than our court.

Like countless other state and federal decisions involving tribal
membership disputes, the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Arviso and Lewis
148
rested on Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the leading Supreme Court
case on the issue of tribal sovereignty and membership. In Santa Clara,
the Court held that a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal
purposes was central to its existence as an independent political
community and thus, that federal courts have no jurisdiction to resolve
149
intra-tribal disputes over memberships. Following Santa Clara, federal
courts have repeatedly recognized that “the tribal self-government
exception is designed to except purely intramural matters such as
conditions of tribal membership . . . from the general rule that otherwise
150
applicable federal statutes apply to Indian tribes.” Accordingly, they
“have held that tribal immunity bars suits to force tribes to comply with
their membership provisions, as well as suits to force tribes to change
151
their membership provisions.”
Although Santa Clara would appear to foreclose a federal court
remedy in tribal membership disputes, that has not stopped plaintiffs
from seeking to avoid its implications. For instance, in Lewis, the plaintiffs
argued that Santa Clara left open the possibility that where there is no
law-applying body, such as a tribal court or council, there may be federal
review because in Santa Clara there was an adjudicative body to which the
152
plaintiffs could complain. However, the Ninth Circuit rejected that
153
contention. Instead, the court concluded that the lack of a tribal court
was not a sufficient reason to avoid Santa Clara, as there was a tribal
council and general council to which plaintiffs could complain and
154
appeal. In so concluding, the court again relied on Santa Clara, which
had noted that even non-judicial tribal institutions could nevertheless be
155
competent law-abiding bodies. Indeed, the competency of these bodies
147

Id. (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 48 (1996)).
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49.
149
Id. at 71–72.
150
Lewis, 424 F.3d at 961 (quoting Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751
F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985)); see Smith v. Babbitt, 100 F.3d 556, 558 (8th Cir.
1996); Apodaca v. Silvas, 19 F.3d 1015, 1016 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); see also, e.g.,
NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir 2003);
EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Housing Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2001); Fla.
Paraplegic, Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 1126, 1129 (11th Cir.
1999); Chao v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, No. CV-07-0354-CI, 2008 WL 4443821, at *2
(E.D. Wash., Sept. 24, 2008); Chao v. Matheson, No. C06-5361RBL, 2007 WL
1830738, at *2 (W.D. Wash., June 25, 2007); Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm
Springs Forest Prods. Indust., 730 F. Supp. 324, 327 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
151
Lewis, 424 F.3d at 961(citing Ordinance 59 Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior
Sec’y, 163 F.3d 1150, 1157 (10th Cir. 1998)); Apodaca, 19 F.3d at 1016.
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Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65.
153
Lewis, 424 F.3d at 962.
154
Id.
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Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 66.
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156

was to be presumed. Moreover, the appeals court reasoned that the
issue was “not whether the plaintiffs’ claims would be successful in these
tribal forums, but only whether tribal forums exist that could potentially
157
resolve the plaintiffs’ claims.”
Persevering, federal plaintiffs—like those in Arviso and Lewis—
attempted to avoid Santa Clara by suing federal agencies under the
158
159
Administrative Procedure Act rather than the tribes directly. Under
this approach, plaintiffs contended that the defendant federal agencies
had breached their duty to act under applicable federal regulations and
160
tribal law. Just as the Ninth Circuit did in Lewis, federal courts have
consistently held that “plaintiffs cannot get around Santa Clara by
161
bringing suit against the government.” Instead, in any such suit against
these federal agencies, the tribe would be an indispensable party because
of its sovereign interest in membership and in protecting its
162
sovereignty. Moreover, because of that sovereign immunity, the tribe
163
could not be joined. Thus, even when tribal law empowers the BIA to
have some involvement in tribal membership decisions, that authority is
limited to what is permitted by the tribe’s articles of association or
164
enrollment ordinances.
Accordingly, any decision implicating the tribe’s membership, even
with respect to the BIA’s action or inaction, would necessarily be bound
up in tribal law and its sovereign right to determine its own
165
membership. As the Tenth Circuit explained, a “federal court order
compelling the [federal agency] to comply with the requests of [alleged
members] would not have the effect of enrolling [alleged members] in
the tribe because tribes, not the federal government, retain authority to

156

See id.
Lewis, 424 F.3d at 962. On the other hand, if there is no tribal remedy, the
possibility for federal jurisdiction may remain. See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe
& Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682, 684–85 (10th Cir. 1980). However, even in Dry
Creek, the court found federal jurisdiction where the issue related to a matter outside
internal tribal affairs and there was no adequate tribal remedy. Id. Thus, Dry Creek
does not necessarily support the same conclusion where there is no tribal remedy but
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Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–02. (2006); Appellants’
Opening Brief, supra note 87, at 1; Brief for Appellants, supra note 118, at 34.
159
Arviso v. Norton, 129 F. App’x 391, 393 (9th Cir. 2005); Lewis, 424 F.3d at 962.
160
Arviso, 129 F. App’x at 393; Lewis, 424 F.3d at 962–63.
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Lewis, 424 F.3d at 963; see, e.g., Williams v. Gover, 490 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir.
2007); Arviso, 129 F. App’x at 394; Hall v. Babbitt, No. 99-3806ND, 2000 WL 268485,
at *1–2 (8th Cir. Mar. 10, 2000); Ordinance 59 Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior
Sec’y, 163 F.3d 1150, 1160 (10th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Babbitt, 100 F.3d 556, 559 (8th
Cir. 1996).
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Arviso, 129 F. App’x at 392, 394; see Lewis, 424 F.3d at 962–63.
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166

determine tribal membership.” Ultimately, because the tribe’s interest
in sovereignty outweighs the plaintiffs’ interest in litigating, dismissal was
167
appropriate.
Finally, as did the plaintiffs in Lewis, federal plaintiffs have tried to
168
skirt Santa Clara and tribal sovereign immunity by invoking IGRA.
IGRA grants federal courts jurisdiction over “any cause of action initiated
by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on
Indian lands and conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact
169
entered into.” This provision has been read as abrogating tribal
sovereign immunity “in the narrow category of cases where compliance
with IGRA’s provisions is at issue and where only declaratory or injunctive
170
relief is sought.” Despite the narrowness of the waiver, plaintiffs have
contended that IGRA permits federal jurisdiction over membership
171
disputes. According to this reasoning, because membership disputes
implicate tribal gaming revenue, IGRA’s immunity waiver applies and
172
federal jurisdiction is proper.
Federal courts have repeatedly rejected attempts to broaden IGRA’s
waiver of immunity to permit federal jurisdiction over membership
173
disputes. Instead, courts emphasize that IGRA waives tribal sovereign
174
immunity only when compliance with IGRA is at issue. In so holding, it
is significant that nothing in IGRA provides federal oversight or
jurisdiction over tribal membership disputes and IGRA makes no attempt
175
to define membership. To the contrary, the regulations promulgated
under IGRA explicitly exempt government involvement in disputes over
176
Rather, the regulations provide that such
gaming distributions.
166
Ordinance 59 Ass’n, 163 F.3d at 1160; see also Confederated Tribes of the
Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1991).
167
See Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1025 (9th Cir. 2002).
168
See, e.g., Lewis, 424 F.3d at 962; see also Smith v. Babbitt, 100 F.3d 556, 559 (8th
Cir. 1996); Lincoln v. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe, 967 F. Supp. 966, 966 (E.D.
Mich. 1997). For instance, in Smith v. Babbitt, tribal members and nonmembers sued
tribal and federal officials, alleging that ineligible persons were improperly receiving
gaming proceeds, while others were being improperly denied gaming proceeds to
which they were entitled. Smith, 100 F.3d at 557. The court held that the plaintiffs
were alleging violations of federal gaming regulations in an attempt to get an intratribal conflict over the tribe’s membership determinations into federal court. Id. at
559.
169
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2006).
170
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 131 F.3d 1379, 1385 (10th Cir. 1997).
171
See Lewis, 424 F.3d at 962; see also, e.g., Smith, 100 F.3d at 558; Lincoln, 967 F.
Supp. at 967.
172
See, e.g., Lewis, 424 F.3d at 962–63; see also Smith, 100 F.3d at 558; Lincoln, 967 F.
Supp. at 967.
173
See, e.g., Lewis, 424 F.3d at 963; see also Smith, 100 F.3d at 559; Lincoln, 967 F.
Supp. at 967.
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Lewis, 424 F.3d at 962 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe, 131 F.3d at 1385); see also
Smith, 100 F.3d at 559; Lincoln, 967 F. Supp. at 967.
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See Lewis, 424 F.3d at 962–63; see 25 C.F.R. § 290.23 (2009).
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25 C.F.R. § 290.23 (“[D]isputes arising from the allocation of net gaming
revenue and the distribution of per capita payments” are to be resolved through “a
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disputes are properly handled by tribal courts or administrative
177
processes. As the Eight Circuit explained,
This is an internal tribal membership dispute. It is not a dispute over
compliance with IGRA, and does not belong in federal court.
Congress did not define “member” when it enacted IGRA, nor
would federally imposed criteria be consonant with federal Indian
policy. The great weight of authority holds that tribes have exclusive
authority to determine membership issues. A sovereign tribe’s
ability to determine its own membership lies at the very core of
tribal self-determination; indeed, there is perhaps no greater
intrusion upon tribal sovereignty than for a federal court to
178
interfere with a sovereign tribe’s membership determinations.
Consequently, stuck between “the double jurisdictional whammy of
179
sovereign immunity and lack of federal court jurisdiction,” aggrieved
tribal members and prospective members are left without a federal
remedy in tribal membership disputes. Nevertheless, as these cases—and
resulting press coverage—have increased, so have calls for congressional
action to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity to allow federal oversight
over tribal enrollment decisions. This is the wrong approach.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
At their crux, tribal membership disputes are more about tribal
180
identity than gaming. Too often, however, the proposed solutions have
sought to reduce a complex issue of cultural identity into a one-size-fits
all measurement, relying on federal intervention or biological markers.
Such solutions also undermine sovereignty by diminishing or erasing the
tribal role in membership decision making.

tribal court system, forum or administrative process . . . .”); see Lewis, 424 F.3d at 963;
Smith, 100 F.3d at 558; Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, No. C 05-00093 MHP,
2005 WL 1806368, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2005).
177
25 C.F.R. § 290.23.
178
Smith, 100 F.3d at 559 (quoting Smith v. Babbitt, 875 F. Supp. 1353, 1360–61
(D. Minn. 1995)).
179
Lewis, 424 F.3d at 960.
180
It is important to note that these membership disputes are taking place within
the context of changing ideas of identity, with more and more people claiming
mixed-ethnicity, which makes it more difficult to put people into tidy “identity”
boxes. Accordingly, while recognizing that this topic touches on a much broader
discussion, this Article focuses on one small piece of that discussion, namely tribal
definitions of “Indian” for enrollment purposes and whether, and to what extent,
Congress or the federal courts should be involved in resolving disputes over
membership. This Article does not address those cases where a tribe changes its
criteria.
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A. Federal Intervention Means Less Sovereignty
The Lewis court’s plea to “higher authorities” was in essence a call for
181
the Supreme Court or Congress to take corrective action. Presumably,
any federal action would likely curtail tribal sovereignty by injecting
federal courts or Congress into tribal membership decisions. This is an
approach the Supreme Court rejected in Santa Clara. Nevertheless, it has
been more than thirty years since the Supreme Court issued its decision
182
in Santa Clara. Since that time, Indian gaming has grown, possibly
raising the premium on tribal membership. Certainly the stakes are
higher than when Santa Clara was decided, as tribal membership can now
183
mean the difference between a life of poverty or one of wealth. Perhaps
it is this disparity that makes the lack of a federal remedy so troubling.
However, while it is perhaps frustrating to imagine that tribal gambling
proceeds are interfering with tribal membership determinations, federal
court intervention is not the answer.
Arguably, Santa Clara involved a set of facts even more disturbing
than those presented by cases such as Arviso or Lewis. In Santa Clara, the
plaintiff Julia Martinez was an enrolled member of the Santa Clara
184
Pueblo. Martinez had lived on the Pueblo’s reservation her entire
185
life. Martinez married a Navajo Indian and the couple had several
186
children together. Martinez’s children were raised on the Pueblo’s
187
reservation and continued to live there as adults.
Before Martinez’s marriage, the tribe passed an ordinance that
denied membership to the children of female members who married
outside the tribe, but not to the children of male members who married
188
outside the tribe. Because of this ordinance, Martinez’s children could
189
not become enrolled members of the Pueblo. Consequently, her
190
children could not vote in tribal elections or hold tribal office. Perhaps
more unsettling, in the event of their mother’s death, Martinez’s
children would have no right to remain on the reservation and could not
inherit their mother’s home or her interest in the Pueblo’s communal
191
lands.
Before filing suit, Martinez worked to persuade the Pueblo to change
192
its membership rules. When those efforts failed, Martinez filed suit in
federal court against the tribe and its governor on behalf of all women
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Lewis, 424 F.3d at 963.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
See Cooper, supra note 9.
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 52 & n.2.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 53.
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who were members of the Pueblo but whose children were denied
193
membership on the basis of the tribal ordinance. Martinez’s suit
asserted that the Pueblo’s ordinance violated the Indian Civil Rights Act’s
194
(ICRA) equal protection clause.
In dismissing Martinez’s suit, the Supreme Court held that the
195
In so ruling, the Court first
Pueblo was immune from suit.
acknowledged that “Indian tribes are ‘distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights’ in matters of local
196
Although the tribes might not possess full
self-government.”
sovereignty, they nonetheless “remain a ‘separate people, with the power
197
of regulating their internal and social relations.’” This sovereign status
rendered them immune from suit in the same way it protected other
198
sovereign governments. While Congress’s plenary power permitted it to
abrogate that immunity, Congress had not, with one exception, done so
199
In the absence of
with respect to suits brought under ICRA.
200
congressional action, the tribes remained immune.
The Court then turned to examine whether Martinez’s claim against
the Pueblo’s governor, who was not protected by sovereign immunity, was
201
cognizable under ICRA. On this point, the Court first recognized that
“providing a federal forum for issues arising under [25 U.S.C.] § 1302
constitutes an interference with tribal autonomy and self-government
193

Id. at 53 & n.3.
Id. at 51; Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8).
Id. at 58–59.
196
Id. at 55 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)); see
also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981); WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: IN A NUTSHELL 400–01 (5th ed. 2009).
197
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 381–382 (1886)).
198
Id. at 58.
199
See id. Under ICRA, Congress had only provided for federal review of tribal
decisions under ICRA’s habeas corpus provision. Id. The Ninth Circuit has recently
rejected an attempt to employ the habeas provision in a membership dispute.
Jeffredo v. Macarro, No. 08-55037, 2009 WL 4912143, at *3–6 (9th Cir. Dec. 22,
2009). In Jeffredo v. Macarro, the Circuit court held that the appellants, who had been
disenrolled from their tribes, could not use ICRA’s habeas provision to challenge
their disenrollments from the Pechenga Tribe. Id. at *6. According to the court,
because the appellants were not detained or “in custody,” the habeas provision did
not apply and the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. Id. at *3.
As the court explained: “We cannot circumvent our lack of jurisdiction over these
matters by expanding the scope of the writ of habeas corpus to cover the exact same
subject matter. At its heart, this case is a challenge to disenrollment of certain
members by the tribe. It is precisely because we lack jurisdiction to hear such claims,
however, that Appellants brought this case under habeas corpus law. We find (and
the parties direct us to) nothing in the legislative history of § 1303 that suggests the
provision should be interpreted to cover disenrollment proceedings. Because nothing
in the legislative history suggests otherwise and because binding precedent precludes
review of disenrollment proceedings, we cannot accept Appellants’ invitation to
expand habeas corpus here.” Id. at *6.
200
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58.
201
Id. at 59.
194
195
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202

beyond that created by the change in substantive law itself.” As the
Court explained, “‘subject[ing] a dispute arising on the reservation
among reservation Indians to a forum other than the one they have
established for themselves,’ may ‘undermine the authority of the tribal
cour[t] . . . and hence . . . infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
203
themselves.’” With that understanding, the Court then considered
204
whether ICRA provided an implied cause of action. While it was clear
to the Court that Martinez was within the class of persons the Act was
designed to benefit, it was equally clear that Congress had not intended
205
to provide for a cause of action.
206
Congress drafted ICRA to serve two distinct purposes. On the one
hand, Congress sought to “‘secur[e] for the American Indian the broad
constitutional rights afforded to other Americans,’ and thereby to
‘protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal
207
On the other hand, “Congress also intended to
governments.’”
promote the well-established federal ‘policy of furthering Indian self208
government.’” Consequently, Congress did not apply the entirety of the
Bill of Rights to tribal governments. Rather, it took a more piecemeal
approach so as to account for the unique cultural, social, and economic
209
needs of the tribes. According to the Court, in passing ICRA Congress
210
did not wish to intrude on tribal self-government. Indeed, Congress
211
deliberately chose to omit federal remedies from ICRA.

202

Id.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387–88 (1976); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
204
Id. at 60.
205
See id. at 61–69.
206
See Eric Wolpin, Comment, Answering Lara’s Call: May Congress Place Nonmember
Indians Within Tribal Jurisdiction Without Running Afoul of Equal Protection or Due Process
Requirements?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1071, 1080 (2006) (“The ICRA was passed by
Congress with the dual intent of preventing tribal interference with individual civil
rights and preserving tribal capacity to self-govern.”).
207
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 61 (quoting COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, S. REP. NO. 90-841, at 5–6 (1967));
see Wolpin, supra note 206, at 1080.
208
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
551 (1974)); Wolpin, supra note 206, at 1080.
209
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62–63. According to the Court, Congress was
primarily concerned about abuses of tribal power in the administration of criminal
justice. Id. at 71. Hence, ICRA’s inclusion of a habeas review, which targeted that
concern. Id.
210
Id. at 71; see Wolpin, supra note 206, at 1080 (noting the “Court has upheld
congressional intent to provide only a minimally intrusive mechanism for enforcing
the ICRA, and has refused to read implicit authorizations of civil actions or actions
for declaratory or injunctive relief into the ICRA”).
211
See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 61–69; Wolpin, supra note 206, at 1080
(“The statute only permits federal review of tribal court action through federal
habeas corpus review.”).
203
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Instead, Congress believed that tribal forums were better positioned
212
to evaluate tribal traditions and customs than federal courts. While the
Court rejected the notion that tribes are the equivalent of foreign
nations, it acknowledged that “the tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations
which, by government structure, culture, and source of sovereignty are in
many ways foreign to the constitutional institutions of the Federal and
213
State governments.” Permitting federal court interference in tribal
membership decisions could “substantially interfere with a tribe’s ability
214
to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity.”
As the Court explained:
A tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has
long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent
political community. . . . Given the often vast gulf between tribal
traditions and those with which federal courts are more intimately
familiar, the judiciary should not rush to create causes of action
215
that would intrude on these delicate matters.
In light of these considerations, federal courts lacked jurisdiction over
216
tribal membership disputes. Through Santa Clara, the Supreme Court
recognized that the tribes’ sole authority to determine their own
membership lies at the core of tribal sovereignty.
Not surprisingly, although Santa Clara is considered as strongly
217
supportive of tribal sovereignty, it has received quite a bit of criticism.
Nonetheless, federal courts have repeatedly recognized that “the tribal
self-government exception is designed to except purely intramural
matters such as conditions of tribal membership . . . from the general
218
rule that otherwise applicable federal statutes apply to Indian tribes.”
Consequently, tribal immunity continues to bar suits seeking to compel
tribes to change their membership criteria or to comply with already
219
established criteria.

212
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65 (“Tribal courts have repeatedly been
recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting
important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.”).
213
Id. at 71.
214
Id. at 72.
215
Id. at 72 n.32 (citations omitted).
216
Id. at 72.
217
See Francine R. Skenandore, Comment, Revisiting Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez: Feminist Perspectives on Tribal Sovereignty, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 347 (2002);
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 144, at 399–405 (discussing Santa Clara tribe’s perspectives
on concept of membership in their community in terms of tribal custom, tradition,
and history); Rave, supra note 13 (noting that courts rely on Martinez in dismissing
membership suits and quoting critic’s contention that “Martinez is handcuffing
judges”).
218
Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985);
see also Smith v. Babbitt, 100 F.3d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 1996); Apodaca v. Silvas, 19 F.3d
1015, 1016 (5th Cir. 1994).
219
See Ordinance 59 Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Sec’y, 163 F.3d 1150, 1157
(10th Cir. 1998); Apodaca, 19 F.3d at 1016.
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This is as it should be. Tribal membership decisions go to the heart
220
of tribal sovereignty. The right to accept or exclude persons from a
221
nation’s citizenry is critical to its sovereign survival. Moreover, it is
unlikely that the Court will act absent congressional action. As the Santa
Clara Court explained, Congress’s authority over Indian tribes is broad,
but “the role of courts in adjusting relations between and among tribes
222
and their members [is] correspondingly restrained.” It is Congress that
“retains authority expressly to authorize civil actions for injunctive or
other relief to redress violations of [25 U.S.C.] § 1302, in the event that
the tribes themselves prove deficient in applying and enforcing its
223
substantive provisions.” However,
unless and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the
additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such
actions in a federal forum would represent, we are constrained to
find that § 1302 does not impliedly authorize actions for
declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe or its
officers.224
Congressional action is, in fact, the solution proposed by many
225
226
courts, many plaintiffs, and several scholars. And it is a possibility.
Despite the strong pronouncements of tribal sovereignty over
220
Alva C. Mather, Comment, Old Promises: The Judiciary and the Future of Native
American Federal Acknowledgment Litigation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1827, 1833 (2003);
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 18 (D.N.M. 1975) (“Much has been
written about tribal sovereignty. If those words have any meaning at all, they must
mean that a tribe can make and enforce its decisions without regard to whether an
external authority considers those decisions wise. To abrogate tribal decisions,
particularly in the delicate area of membership, for whatever ‘good’ reasons, is to
destroy cultural identity under the guise of saving it.”).
221
See Skenadore, supra note 217, at 348–49 (“Only a tribal government may
define its membership through prescribed criteria in tribal codes and ordinances. No
other governmental body, such as another tribe, an individual state, or the United
States may decide who will become a member.”).
222
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
See Reitman, supra note 19, at 863.
226
Indeed, federal involvement in tribal decision-making about citizenship is
already alive and well. Nicole J. Laughlin, Identity Crisis: An Examination of Federal
Infringement on Tribal Autonomy to Determine Membership, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 98, 117
(2007). Federal involvement is most apparent “when federal decision-making
intersects with definitions of tribal citizenship.” Goldberg, supra note 19, at 448. The
Chief of the BIA’s Division of Tribal Government Services described this involvement:
“The Bureau of Indian Affairs exercises its authority to intervene in enrollment
matters when the tribe is preparing a membership roll for distribution of tribal assets
held in trust [by the federal government], when Federal interests are involved, such
as challenges to a Secretarial election, or when the governing document authorizes
the Secretary of the Interior’s involvement, such as an appeal from an adverse tribal
decision. Even then, however, our decision would be based on the tribal constitution
or other organic documents such as constitutions and bylaws, articles of association,
ordinances, and resolutions.” Id. (quoting Letter from Chief, Division of Tribal
Government Services, Bureau of Indian Affairs, to Leroy Salgado (Sept. 24, 1998)).
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membership contained in Santa Clara, Congress still retains plenary
227
power over the tribes. Although the history of federal law regarding
tribal sovereignty is too complex to go into here, it suffices to say that
Supreme Court precedent and congressional action has created a bind.
On the one hand, it has provided tribes with sovereign immunity, which
can “deny a remedy to those with legitimate grievances against tribal
228
governments.” On the other hand, it has also held that Congress can
override tribal governments by exercising its plenary power over the
229
Thus, “an aggressive assertion of tribal immunity could
tribes.
endanger tribes by inviting further [federal] incursions on their
230
sovereignty.”
Given the increased stakes brought by gaming, it is conceivable that
Congress may be pressed to act to curb what are increasingly being
viewed as tribal excesses when it comes to enrollment decisions. One
231
232
target of reform is ICRA. Over tribal protests, Congress enacted ICRA
to selectively apply some of the rights enshrined in the U.S.
233
Constitution’s Bill of Rights to Indians subject to tribal governments.
As Santa Clara makes clear, ICRA provides no remedy to aggrieved
234
tribal members in membership disputes as currently written.
Nevertheless, Congress could amend ICRA to create new remedies for
tribal violations of civil liberties. In fact, in the last several years, some
tribal members have called for federal court intervention and a waiver of

227
See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978); Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
228
Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 137
(2004); see Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign
Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental
Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 732 (2002) (“[W]hen there
is no separation of powers within tribal governments and tribal sovereign immunity
protects tribal government from civil rights claims, tribal members are left without
recourse.”).
229
See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 319; Morton, 417 U.S. at 551–52; Worcester, 31 U.S. at
559; see also FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 133 (1942); Struve,
supra note 228, at 137.
230
Struve, supra note 228, at 137.
231
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–41 (2006).
232
Kent McNeil, Aboriginal Governments and the Charter: Lessons from the United
States, 17 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 73, 91 (2002).
233
Before ICRA, the Constitution’s Bill of Rights did not apply to tribal
governments. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (finding the Fifth
Amendment did not operate upon the Cherokee nation). For its part, ICRA
incorporates only part of the Bill of Rights. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 144, at 390.
Specifically, it does not include First Amendment (1) protection against the
establishment of religion; (2) a guarantee of a republican form of government; (3) a
privileges and immunities clause; (4) a provision for the right to vote; (5) a
requirement for the right to free counsel for those accused of crimes; (6) the right to
a jury in a civil trial; or (6) the right to bear arms. Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal
Council, 272 F.2d 131, 135 (10th Cir. 1959).
234
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 69–72 (1978).
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235

tribal sovereign immunity if tribes fail to act in accordance with ICRA.
236
Further, at least one group is calling on Congress to amend ICRA.
In October 2005, a group calling itself the American Indian Rights
and Resource Organization (AIRRO) began pressing for an amendment
to ICRA that would permit individuals to sue tribes in federal court by
waiving tribal sovereign immunity if the tribes failed to comply with
237
ICRA. AIRRO is comprised of former tribal members who were
238
disenrolled from the Redding Rancheria. Focusing on California,
AIRRO launched its efforts with a public demonstration in Ukiah,
California, seeking to call attention to the plight of disenrolled members
239
of the Rancheria. AIRRO continued its calls to amend ICRA in other
240
protests throughout California.
Two years later, the California Democratic Convention considered a
resolution to reform ICRA to permit federal review of membership
decisions under the guise of protecting members from civil rights
241
violations. According to its advocates, the “California Native American
Justice and Equal Economic Opportunity Legislative Initiative” would
provide redress to tribal members whose rights have been denied in
242
violation of ICRA. The primary objective of the initiative is to permit
243
nontribal review of tribal enrollment decisions. Although the Native
American Caucus of the California Democratic Party passed the
resolution, it does not appear to have progressed beyond these initial
244
stages.
It is worth noting that despite the lackluster results of current efforts,
amending ICRA to provide for federal court review is not a far-fetched
notion. Indeed, sixteen years earlier, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced a
bill that would have provided a federal remedy in situations where the
245
tribal court is not sufficiently independent of the tribal council. Senate
235

Rave, supra note 15.
See Louis Galvan, American Indians Protest Tribal Injustices: Protesters at Friant
Rally Say They Were Unfairly Treated by Tribes That Own Casinos, FRESNO BEE, June 11,
2006, at B5.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
See Rave, supra note 13. Given that California casinos have garnered the largest
percentage of gaming revenues while also having the largest numbers of
disenrollments, AIRRO’s focus on California appears apt.
240
See Johnson, supra note 67 (describing plan of protesters to demonstrate
whenever tribes attempt to build new casinos); Galvan, supra note 236.
241
Mary Weston, Democrats to Hear Resolution on Indian Civil Rights Reform,
OROVILLE MERCURY REG., Apr. 24, 2007.
242
Id.
243
See id. (discussing proposed initiative with sole focus on membership
disputes); Mary Weston, Disenrolled Native Americans Ask for Redress, OROVILLE MERCURY
REG., July 23, 2007; see Johnson, supra note 67.
244
Weston, supra note 243.
245
Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
841, 881–83 (1990) (citing Indian Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1989, S. 517, 101th
Cong. (1989)).
236
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Bill 517 would have granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear civil rights
claims alleging that a tribe violated ICRA after the aggrieved plaintiff
246
exhausted all tribal remedies. The district court would have been
required to adopt the tribal court’s findings of fact unless it determined
that the tribal court was not independent of the tribal council or
247
executive. Although the bill was introduced in both the 100th and 101st
Congresses, and was referred to the Judiciary Committee for review, it
248
does not appear to have made it out of committee. Neither have later
249
efforts.
In addition to these efforts, activist groups have employed other
250
tactics to more directly influence the tribes’ decision-making. For
instance, the American Indian Legacy Center in Fresno, California,
began a letter writing campaign aimed at discouraging celebrities from
appearing at casinos owned by a tribe embroiled in a membership
251
dispute. Initial efforts proved successful, with the group prompting the
likes of Bill Cosby to cancel his scheduled performance at the tribe’s
252
casino.
Despite public calls for change, Congress has not acted to expressly
253
abrogate tribal immunity. For instance, in 1993, Congress passed the
254
Indian Tribal Justice Act (ITJA), which was intended to provide
255
funding and otherwise strengthen tribal court systems. Significantly,
Congress did not take that opportunity to amend ICRA or to abrogate
256
sovereign immunity despite calls to do so. Instead,
Congress has consistently reiterated its approval of the immunity
doctrine. . . . Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with
such tribal immunity or limit it . . . . [However, Congress’s] Acts
reflect Congress’ desire to promote the “goal of Indian self-

246

Id. at 881–83 & n.111 (citing S. 517).
Id.
248
See Rave, supra note 13 (describing more recent efforts to amend ICRA along
the lines of Hatch’s proposed amendment).
249
See Galvan, supra note 236; see also Rave, supra note 13 (noting that moves to
amend ICRA to provide federal oversight of tribal membership decisions is likely to
receive little tribal support).
250
Kelley, supra note 12.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
McNeil, supra note 232, at 88–89 & n.93.
254
Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (1993) (codified as amended 25 U.S.C.
§§ 3601–3631 (2006)).
255
Carl H. Johnson, A Comity of Errors: Why John v. Baker Is Only a Tentative First
Step in the Right Direction, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 20 (2001); see 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (stating
that “tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal governments,” and that
“traditional tribal justice practices are essential to the maintenance of the culture and
identity of Indian tribes”).
256
See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631; see also Clinton, supra note 245, at 881–83.
247
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government, including its overriding goal of encouraging tribal self257
sufficiency and economic development.”

Thus, even assuming that Congress should act, it seems unlikely that
it will act. Likewise, the federal courts have continued to hold that they
lack jurisdiction to consider membership disputes absent an explicit
move by Congress.
While Congress’s restraint is laudable, it is unclear whether Congress
will continue to avoid the issue. To the extent tribal membership disputes
are viewed as overreaching, Congress could intervene and limit tribal
sovereignty and permit federal jurisdiction over membership claims to
258
rectify any perceived unfairness. Thus, it is essential that the tribes act
first to protect their right to self government and self determination. Any
solution to this issue must ensure fairness to the parties in enrollment
259
disputes without trampling on tribal sovereignty.
B. Biological Markers: Blood Quantum & DNA Are Bad Proxies for Culture
To some, an obvious solution to the legal quandary posed by
membership disputes is to use DNA to scientifically determine biological
260
affiliation.
Under this theory, DNA would provide for more
261
conclusive—and less messy—determinations of tribal membership. A
central problem with such an approach, however, is that it would
necessitate a shift away from a tribal membership based on cultural
262
affiliation to one based on a biological marker. Nevertheless, Indian
law has long relied on the biological marker of blood quantum to define
“Indian.” Indeed, while DNA testing may represent the latest challenge to
tribal and ethnic identity, it is by no means the first biological test of
“Indianness.”
The federal government first referenced blood quantum in treaties
263
with individual tribes in the early nineteenth century. Initially, however,
blood quantum was not used to determine tribal ancestry and there was
264
no legal significance to a blood quantum description. However, in later
257

Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
510 (1991) (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,
216 (1987)).
258
See COHEN, supra note 229, at 133.
259
Skenandore, supra note 217, at 369.
260
See, e.g., Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 168–70 (discussing rationales for using
blood quantum requirements); Goldberg, supra note 19, at 458–71(discussing varying
viewpoints on use of blood quanta as membership criteria); Pratt, supra note 19, at
1259 (discussing use of DNA to resolve dispute over inclusion of Black Seminoles into
tribe).
261
See Rave, supra note 13 (explaining that disenrolled members attempted to
use DNA analysis to establish kinship and, thereby, prove eligibility for membership).
262
Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935,
51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2006); Rebecca Tsosie, The New Challenge to Native Identity: An
Essay on “Indigeneity” and “Whiteness,” 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 87 (2005).
263
Spruhan, supra note 262, at 10–11.
264
Id.
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treaties, blood quantum began to be used to determine eligibility for
certain property or benefits under federal law, but not to determine
265
tribal membership. It was not until 1935 that blood quantum began to
266
operate as a proxy for Indian identity under federal law.
267
In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),
268
which permitted Indian tribes to draft their own constitutions. The
269
constitutions, however, were subject to federal approval. Consequently,
the IRA compelled many tribes to adopt blood quantum tests in order to
270
receive federal recognition and assistance. Under the Act, “Indian” was
defined to include:
all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized
Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who
are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934,
residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation,
and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian
blood.271
Thus, to be “Indian” under federal law required the requisite one-half
blood quantum, as the IRA excluded those persons who had no
biological connection to a tribe, such as by adoption or marriage, from
272
the definition of “Indian.” In effect, biology became proxy for tribal
affiliation at least under federal law, though not necessarily under tribal
273
law.
The guiding principle behind the adoption of this definition was a
desire “to limit the application of Indian benefits [under the Act] to
those who are Indians by virtue of actual tribal affiliation or by virtue of
274
possessing one-half degree or more of Indian blood.” As Senator
Wheeler more bluntly put it in explaining why a one-half blood condition
was preferable to one-quarter, “[w]hat we are trying to do is get rid of the
265

Id. at 11. In some treaties, however, the federal government did recognize
persons of “mixed blood” as tribal members. Id. at 12.
266
Id. at 45–47. However, even earlier, at the request of the certain tribes,
Congress had specifically limited tribal membership in certain tribes based on blood
quantum. Id. at 45–46. For instance, in 1931 Congress passed an act that restricted
membership in the Eastern Cherokee tribe to those persons possessing more than
one-sixteenth Cherokee blood. Id. at 45. In similar legislation, Congress restricted
membership in the Menominee tribe to those with one-quarter or more of
Menominee blood. Id.
267
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 383, 48 Stat. 984, 984–88
(codified as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2006)).
268
25 U.S.C. § 476(a).
269
Id.
270
See id. § 479; Spruhan, supra note 262, at 4.
271
25 U.S.C. § 479 (emphasis added); see also Spruhan, supra note 262, at 47.
272
Spruhan, supra note 262, at 47.
273
See id.
274
Goldberg, supra note 19, at 446–47 (alteration in original) (citing OFFICE OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CIRCULAR NO. 3123 (1935), reprinted in 2
AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, 94TH CONG., TASK FORCE NO. 9 FINAL REPORT app.
at 337 (Comm. Print 1977)[hereinafter CIRCULAR NO. 3123]).
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275

Indian problem rather than to add to it.” By requiring a higher degree
of Indian blood, the definition would limit those who qualified, thereby
276
limiting those who could receive federal monies. In short, the point of
277
the DOI’s definition of “Indian” was to define Indians out of existence.
In keeping with this goal, the DOI would “urge and insist that any
constitutional provision conferring automatic tribal membership upon
children hereafter born, should limit such membership to persons who
reasonably can be expected to participate in tribal relations and
278
affairs.” Consequently, because tribal constitutions were subject to DOI
approval, the IRA definition of “Indian,” including its blood quantum
279
requirement, found its way into tribal constitutions. Even those tribes
that opted to forego tribal constitutions to avoid Department approval
could still be persuaded to adopt this definition as a consequence of the
280
BIA’s control over federal services and tribal monies.
Such views have persisted, with the DOI insisting that tribes may only
offer membership to those persons who maintain connections with the
tribe. Indeed, in 1988, ten years after Santa Clara Pueblo, the Assistant
Solicitor of the DOI stated that “while it is true that membership in an
Indian tribe is for the tribe to decide, that principle is dependent on and
subordinate to the more basic principle that membership in an Indian
281
tribe is a bilateral, political relationship.” According to this view, “[a]
tribe does not have authority under the guise of determining its own
membership to include as members persons who are not maintaining
some meaningful sort of political relationship with the tribal
282
government.” Rather, the DOI has “broad and possibly nonreviewable
authority to disapprove or withhold approval of a tribal constitutional
275

Spruhan, supra note 262, at 46 (quoting To Grant to Indians Living Under
Federal Tutelage the Freedom to Organize for Purposes of Local Self-Government and Economic
Enterprise: Hearing on S. 2755 and S. 3645 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d
Cong. 263 (1934) [hereinafter Sen. Wheeler Statement] (statement of Sen. Burton K.
Wheeler, Chairman, Comm. on Indian Affairs)). Senator Wheeler explained: “I do
not think the government of the United States should go out here and take a lot of
Indians in that are quarter bloods and take them in under the provisions of this act. If
they are Indians of the half-blood then the Government should perhaps take them in,
but not unless they are. If you pass it to where they are quarter-blood Indians you are
going to have all kinds of people coming in and claiming they are quarter-blood
Indians and want to be put upon the government rolls, and in my judgment it should
not be done. What we are trying to do is get rid of the Indian problem rather than to
add to it.” Sen. Wheeler Statement, supra.
276
See Spruhan, supra note 262, at 46.
277
Goldberg, supra note 19, at 447.
278
Id. (quoting CIRCULAR NO. 3123, supra note 274, at 334).
279
See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 383, 48 Stat. 984, 984–88
(codified as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2006)).
280
Goldberg, supra note 19, at 447.
281
Margo S. Brownell, Note, Who is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the
Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 307 (2000–
2001) (quoting Memorandum from Scott Keep, Ass’t Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, to the Chief of the Div. of Tribal Gov’t Servs. 6 (Mar. 2, 1988)).
282
Id.
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283

amendment regarding membership criteria.” Such authority would be
exercised if a tribe were to amend its constitution to permit persons
without any tribal relationship with the tribe to become members on the
ground that it would convert tribes from political to a racial
284
classification. As one group has complained, “The BIA has acted to
undermine tribal governments by . . . usurping one of the most basic
powers of self-government—the right to determine membership, by
conditioning
BIA
funding
on
BIA-determined
membership
285
requirements.”
Consequently, today many tribes now include some blood quantum
286
requirement in their membership criteria. In so doing, such “tribes
now accept an explicitly racial conception of Indian identity for purposes
287
of tribal membership.” Rather than being imposed from without,
“tribes [now] voluntarily invoke race-based definitions of ‘Indian’
because they narrow the pool of tribal members,” perhaps in an effort to
limit gaming revenue and federal dollars to “‘bona fide’ (usually full288
blooded) tribal members.”
More important, by embracing blood quantum requirements, the
tribes threaten to accomplish Senator Wheeler’s goal: the elimination of
289
the tribe itself. It is easy to see that blood quantum requirements may
permit a tribe to limit its membership, thereby preserving larger gaming
290
revenue payouts for a smaller cadre of members. However, by so doing,
tribes risk overly restricting membership to the point that the tribe can
291
Indeed, “[i]f tribes maintain blood
no longer perpetuate itself.
quantum requirements for tribal membership, they face two likely
consequences: population decline and increased federal encroachment
292
on tribal sovereignty.”
283

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
285
Id.
286
Neath, supra note 71, at 698.
287
Id. at 690.
288
Id.; see also Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 171.
289
See Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 171. It is important to note that this
argument differs from the notion that by using blood quantum the tribes are
somehow being inauthentic because this is not “traditional” tribal practices that predate European contact. As one commentator has aptly noted, to the extent that the
tribes choose such criteria based on current tribal concerns does not render the
criteria illegitimate “merely because they depart from ‘traditional’ measures.”
Goldberg, supra note 19, at 438. Nevertheless, it is somewhat disconcerting to think of
tribes deliberately reducing their own membership. Kelley, supra note 12. As David
Littlefield, director of the Sequoyah Research Center at the University of Arkansas in
Little Rock, explained, “After the self-determination period in the 1960s and ‘70s they
were looking for members, but as gaming came on there were a number of tribes
looking at membership rolls and trying to restrict them.” Id.
290
Neath, supra note 71, at 698; see also Beckenhauer, supra, note 19, at 163, 168–
69.
291
Neath, supra note 71, at 698; see also Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 163.
292
Neath, supra note 71, at 698; see also Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 163.
284
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Such concerns, however, have not fully halted a move to a more
293
modern variation on blood quantum, i.e., the use of DNA testing. DNA
labs on the internet offer customers the opportunity to test for Indian
294
heritage from the comforts of home. Several of these labs report that
some of their most eager clients are those seeking to prove Indian
295
identity, despite no cultural or other affiliation with a tribe.
Nevertheless, DNA testing is viewed by some as a final determiner of
296
tribal and ethnic identity.
Contrary to the labs’ often overstated claims, however, DNA testing is
297
not a panacea and actually raises more questions than it resolves. First,
the efficacy of DNA testing to determine tribal heritage is itself in
298
Such tests rely on genetic markers as an indicator of
dispute.
299
membership in a particular ethnic group. One wrinkle in this is that all
human beings share 99.9% of their DNA and there are more differences
300
within a particular ethnic group than between any two groups. Of course,
there is some genetic variation between groups that tends to result in
outward differences such as eye, skin, and hair color, or nose and eye
301
Similarly, at the genetic level there can be markers for
shapes.
302
predispositions to certain diseases or different blood type patterns that
can indicate genetic similarity. The problem, however, is that such
variants are often scattered in the general population, meaning that any
individual, regardless of ancestry, could have a similar marker simply as a
303
result of universal variation.
Further, each individual does not receive an equal proportion of
304
genetic data from each parent or grandparent. Consequently, a specific
individual might not express sufficient genes to register on a DNA test
305
even though she has a documented Indian lineage. Similarly, a nonIndian could have a random mutation that matches an “Indian” line even
though the reality is that the latter person has absolutely no Indian
306
heritage. In other words, a negative test does not necessarily mean a
293

Tsosie, supra note 262, at 86.
Id. at 87; Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 162–163, 184.
295
Tsosie, supra note 262, at 87.
296
Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 162, 184.
297
See id. at 163.
298
See generally id.
299
Id. at 175–76.
300
Id. at 175.
301
Id. at 175–76.
302
There are several different blood group systems. The ABO blood group
system is just one. Id. at 176.
303
Thus, for example, even if all of one tribe had type O blood, we could not
conclusively say that a specific person with blood type O was a member of that tribe
because O is a universal variant. Id. at 177.
304
Id. at 178; see also Carla D. Pratt, Tribes and Tribulations: Beyond Sovereign
Immunity and Toward Reparation and Reconciliation for the Estelusti, 11 WASH. & LEE RACE
& ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 61, 110 (2005).
305
Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 182.
306
Id. at 182–83.
294
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specific individual has no indigenous ancestry, only that she or he did not
get that marker or that the marker was not passed on because the
307
individual descended from the opposite gender ancestor. For example,
a negative test relying on DNA through the mother’s lineage would not
308
account for ancestry through the father’s lineage.
309
Moreover, DNA cannot tie an individual to a specific tribe. At
most, DNA can identify North American ancestry, but it cannot link a
particular individual’s genes to a specific tribe because tribes have not
310
been isolated enough to develop tribe-specific genetic markers. This
means that there is no tribe-specific marker that could be used for
311
enrollment purposes. Further, most tribes do not require that members
312
be descended entirely from tribal members. Most require one-eighth to
313
one-quarter blood quantum for membership. Thus, while certain tests
might identify that an individual is descended from a particular region,
314
the degree of ancestry (or tribal affiliation) cannot be established.
Putting the lack of scientific consensus aside, even if DNA testing
could conclusively determine an individual’s biological ancestry, reliance
315
on DNA testing raises more troubling cultural and legal concerns. First,
while some tribes have embraced DNA testing as a way to weed out
imposters, many tribes object vigorously to its use on the ground that
316
being “Indian” is a cultural, not a biological, determination. In this
view, the use of DNA testing would actually usurp tribal sovereignty by
317
substituting a blood test for the tribe’s membership determination.
These critics argue that the blood quantum rule was started by Anglo
318
Americans—prior to the Dawes Act, tribes did not indicate blood
319
quantum as part of their membership criteria. To the extent that
320
reliance on DNA would signal an embrace of the “one drop rule,” it
would ultimately reduce Indian heritage to a blood marker, rather than
321
cultural identity determined by a tribal community.

307
Pratt, supra note 304, at 109 (explaining that even autosomal testing, which
captures broad picture of individual DNA, could still yield false negatives).
308
Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 182; see Pratt, supra note 304, at 108–09.
309
Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 184; Pratt, supra note 304, at 110.
310
See Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 184; Pratt, supra note 304, at 110.
311
See Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 184; Pratt, supra note 304, at 110.
312
Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 172.
313
See id. at 163, 167–72.
314
Id. at 184.
315
Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 186; Tsosie, supra note 262, at 87–88; see Pratt,
supra note 19, at 1256.
316
Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 186; see Tsosie, supra note 262, at 88.
317
Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 187–88.
318
Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
319
See Pratt, supra note 19, at 1249–50, 1254–55; Tsosie, supra note 262, at 87–88
see also Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 186–88.
320
Pratt, supra note 19, at 1241.
321
Beckenhauer, supra note 19, at 186; Tsosie, supra note 262, at 87–88.
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Further, it is unclear whether DNA results would be workable within
the legal definitions already established by federal law. For instance,
many tribes trace membership to membership rolls drafted by the Dawes
322
Commission. However, the Dawes Commission did not record blood
quantum of all Indians. Rather, the Dawes Commission rolls included
only those persons either of Indian or of European and Indian
323
heritage. Persons of mixed African American and American Indian
324
heritage were excluded. Further, the Supreme Court has upheld
entitlements to Indian tribes do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment
325
on the ground that tribes are political entities, not ethnic groups. A
reliance on DNA would abolish that distinction by reducing tribal
membership and Indian identity to a biological marker.
Finally, reliance on DNA or blood quantum would likely exacerbate
current membership disputes and intertribal tension. Indeed, such an
approach raises a number of troubling possibilities. For instance, what
would a tribe do in the case of a longstanding tribal member, who had
lived her entire life on the reservation, had participated in cultural and
326
social aspects of the tribe, and was involved in tribal governance? What
if such a member’s DNA lacked the appropriate biological marker?
Would the tribe be forced to overlook deep cultural affiliation in favor of
a biological marker of uncertain utility? If so, should federal law require
that result?
Ultimately, neither congressional intervention nor DNA analysis
offer the best solution to a complex problem implicating tribal culture,
politics, and sovereignty. There are more than 560 federally recognized
327
tribes, each with varying traditions, cultures, social structures, and

322
Carla D. Pratt, Loving Indian Style: Maintaining Racial Caste and Tribal
Sovereignty Through Sexual Assimilation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 409, 457 & n.284 (2007).
323
Pratt, supra note 19, at 1254–55.
324
Id.
325
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (upholding Indian hiring
preference that required tribal membership and one-quarter blood quantum on
ground that these criteria were based on political rather than racial classification and
granted Indians preference “as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.”). The
Mancari Court explained that “[t]he [hiring] preference is not directed towards a
‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally
recognized’ tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be
classified as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in
nature.” Id. at 553–54. See also Brownell, supra note 281, at 295–98 (discussing
challenge to use of blood quantum in definition of “Indian” in hiring preference
regulations).
326
Brownell, supra note 281, at 307 (“The DOI has stated that it would exert [its]
authority [to withhold approval of a tribal constitution] if a tribe amended its
constitution to grant memberships to descendants, who were not maintaining any
sort of tribal relation because that would constitute a racial criterion.”).
327
See Kathleen A. Ward, Before and After the White Man: Indian Women, Property,
Progress, and Power, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 245, 254 (2007); National Tribal Justice
Resource Center, Tribal Court History, http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/tribal
courts/history.asp.
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histories. Given the diversity among these tribes, it would be
impracticable for Congress to craft a single test to determine tribal
membership that would reflect the tribes’ myriad values and beliefs.
While reliance on DNA markers might seem to offer a quick solution,
even if it were reliable it is overly dependant on biology to the exclusion
of cultural or tribal affiliation. Even if some tribes opted to take that
route, many others would likely reject that approach.
Instead, solutions to the complex legal issues implicated in tribal
membership disputes must recognize the tribes as individual
governments and political entities so that solutions can be tailored to the
328
needs of each tribe, as determined by that tribe. To that end, the
solution lies not in abrogating tribal sovereignty or reducing tribal
membership to a biological marker, but in a more vigorous assertion of
tribal sovereignty and self-determination.
V. MORE SOVEREIGNTY, NOT LESS
Any solution to tribal membership disputes must reconcile two
fundamental objectives: the need to ensure justice for those seeking
tribal membership and the need to preserve tribal autonomy and tribal
329
culture in membership decision making. To the extent tribal autonomy
is viewed as incompatible or inconsistent with the goals of those seeking
membership, it may seem paradoxical to call for increased sovereignty
and self-determination in resolving these disputes. However, it is through
the assertion of more tribal sovereignty that tribes would be able to
reconcile both concerns. Specifically, tribes should more fully assert their
right to determine tribal membership by creating wholly independent
judicial bodies such as an intertribal appellate court that would provide
independent review of tribal membership decisions. Such a system would
also provide redress for those aggrieved by enrollment decisions,
quieting critics’ cries for federal oversight.
Ideally, an intertribal appellate court would oversee appeals from the
courts of multiple tribes, in much the way the United States Courts of
Appeal review appeals from district courts in their constituent states.
Each tribe would have the option to become a member of an intertribal
appellate court as an addition to their current tribal court system. The
330
courts would be staffed and operated by the tribes themselves. In so
328

Skenandore, supra note 217, at 363–64.
Id.
330
There are already models for such a system. For instance, in the Pacific
Northwest, the Northwest Intertribal Court System is a consortium through which
member tribes share judicial resources to ensure that each tribe is able to support a
tribal justice system. Phyllis E. Bernard, Community and Conscience: The Dynamic
Challenge of Lawyers’ Ethics In Tribal Peacemaking, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 821, 833–35
(1996); Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1087
(2007); Jose Luis Jiménez, Indians Establish Own Court System: Mainly Civil Cases
Handled by a Judge, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 28, 2006, at N1; see generally Northwest
329
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doing, these “intertribal courts of appeal” would provide a level of
judicial independence in the review of membership decisions that critics
charge is currently lacking under the current structure of tribal
331
governments and court systems.
Currently, whether a particular membership decision is subject to
any review depends entirely on the individual tribe involved. Tribal
government and court structures vary widely. Generally, most tribes are
governed by a tribal council, which enacts tribal laws and establishes any
332
tribal judiciary. Although some tribes maintain separate judicial and
333
Fewer than half
executive branches, this is not uniformly true.
(approximately 275) of federally recognized tribes have any form of
334
formal tribal court system. Rather, in some tribes the tribal leader is
335
also the tribal judge and there is no written code.

Intertribal Court System, http://www.nics.ws. Similarly, in southern California, the
new Intertribal Court of Southern California (ICSC), which represents tribes in
Southern California by providing mediation and alternative dispute resolution
services, and judges who travel to various reservations to hear cases. See Christine
Zuni, The Southwest Intertribal Court of Appeals, 24 N.M. L. REV. 309 (1994) (discussing
Southwest Intertribal Court of Appeals); Jiménez, supra; Intertribal Court of Southern
California, http://www.icsc.us. Tribes decide individually whether to join ICSC, and
member tribes do not surrender general jurisdiction to the court. Rather, the court
only hears matters specifically designated by tribal law and ordinances. Jiménez,
supra. Each tribe in the region remains able to set up its own tribal court system, but
the ICSC operates as a “circuit court.” Id. The goal of ICSC is to provide an
independent judiciary “to preserve the integrity, autonomy and sovereignty, of the
Native American communities it serves in a culturally sensitive and traditionally aware
environment.” Intertribal Court of Southern California, Tribal Court,
http://www.icsc.us/Tribal%20Court.html.
331
Struve, supra note 228, at 180 (citing AM. INDIAN LAW CTR., INC., SURVEY OF
TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS AND COURTS OF INDIAN OFFENSES FINAL REPORT app. D at 44
(2000)); see also Zuni, supra note 330, at 309.
332
Charles Wilkinson, “Peoples Distinct From Others”: The Making of Modern Indian
Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 379, 392 (2006).
333
Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79
NEB. L. REV. 577, 590 (2000); Max Minzner, Treating Tribes Differently: Civil Jurisdiction
Inside and Outside Indian Country, 6 NEV. L.J. 89, 108–09 (2005).
334
National Tribal Justice Resource Center, supra note 327; David Selden &
Monica Martens, Basic Indian Law Research Tips—Part II: Tribal Law, COLO. LAW., Aug.
2005, at 115, 116. It should be noted that the importance of formality is a concept
that does not necessarily originate with the tribes and may not be shared by Indians
or all tribes equally. See Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country: The Confusing
Parameters of State, Federal, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539, 568–69
(1997). Moreover, the lack of a tribal court does not necessarily mean that there is no
mechanism to resolve disputes or that tribal members can invoke federal court
oversight. See Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65–66 (1978). Indeed, in Lewis, the appellate panel
concluded that the lack of a tribal court was not sufficient, as there was a tribal
council and general council to which plaintiffs could complain and appeal. 424 F.3d
at 962.
335
Atwood, supra note 333, at 592.
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Even among those tribes that do have a formal court system, there is
336
little to no uniformity among those courts. While some tribes have trial
and appellate courts, others do not and may have only one level of
337
judicial decision making. In such tribes, the tribal court system may not
338
provide for any review process. Indeed, in many tribes there is no
judicial body with any oversight over membership decisions, an omission
that essentially makes the enrollment committee’s decision
339
unreviewable. In other tribes, the tribal council may be entrusted with
340
reviewing tribal court decisions. To the extent the tribal council is
involved in enrollment decisions, it is essentially reviewing its own rules
or decisions. Moreover, even in those tribes where there is tribal court
oversight, the tribal court and tribal council may be comprised of all or
341
some of the same members. Where tribal council, enrollment council,
and tribal courts are comprised of either the same people or of people all
with the same interests, there is at least the appearance of a lack of
342
independent oversight.
It is these perceived or actual conflicts of interest that can
undermine tribal courts as the final arbiters of tribal membership
decisions. For instance, in his dissent in Santa Clara, Justice White
highlighted this conflict by noting that “both [the] legislative and judicial
343
powers are vested in the same body, the Pueblo Council.” For White,
“[t]o suggest that this tribal body is the ‘appropriate’ forum for the
adjudication of alleged violations of the ICRA is to ignore both reality
and Congress’ desire to provide a means of redress to Indians aggrieved
344
by their tribal leaders.” Picking up this theme, plaintiffs in cases like
Lewis and Arviso argue for federal court jurisdiction on the ground that
their complaints are not being addressed by an independent judiciary
either because there is no judicial body and they must go to the tribal
council or because the tribal court and council are comprised of the
345
same members. Thus, they contend that federal courts must step in to
346
provide meaningful review.
336

Minzner, supra note 333, at 103–13.
Atwood, supra note 333, at 592.
338
Id.
339
See, e.g., Rave, supra note 13 (describing ousted members’ attempts to appeal a
membership decision that would be heard by the same political body that had ousted
them from tribe).
340
Atwood, supra note 333, at 592.
341
See Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 2005).
342
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 82 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting).
343
Id.
344
Id.
345
See Arviso v. Norton, 129 F. App’x 391, 392 (9th Cir. 2005); Lewis, 424 F.3d at
962. Decisions by tribal courts do not necessarily show tribal courts are unable to
reach independent decisions. For example, of approximately forty-four cases decided
by the Tribal Court of the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of
Oregon between 2001 and 2003, the majority (twenty-four) were remanded—
suggesting at least that the court did not adhere to a knee-jerk reaction to affirm
337
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An intertribal appellate court system would provide these plaintiffs
with such a forum, but one operated by the tribes rather than an outside
347
government. Moreover, providing aggrieved members with a forum to
review their claims would strengthen the credibility of tribal courts and
348
render any claim for federal review unnecessary.
Likewise, the view that tribal courts lack the requisite judicial
independence has spurred calls for congressional intervention to curtail
349
tribal sovereignty where that independence is thought lacking. For
instance, Senator Orrin Hatch’s 1989 proposed amendments to ICRA
sought to afford a federal remedy for tribal members where tribal courts
350
More recently, the
lacked independence from tribal councils.
proponents of amending ICRA to provide federal oversight of
membership decisions argued that the amendment is necessary to
provide an independent level of review and members with meaningful
351
redress. The establishment of an intertribal appellate court would
mean that parties’ cases could be heard before a neutral panel, leading
to a greater perception of fairness and due process, and, thus, legitimacy

tribal membership decisions. See Analysis of Cases Decided by the Tribal Court of the
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon between 2001 and
2003 (copy on file with author). This suggestion is further supported by the standard
of review, which, under the Tribal Court Code of the Confederated Tribes, requires
remand only if the membership decision is found to be “arbitrary and capricious.” See
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OF OREGON, TRIBAL CODE
§ 4.10(d)(4)(H) (2003), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
gr410enroll.htm.
346
See Arviso, 129 F. App’x at 392; Lewis, 424 F.3d at 962.
347
See, e.g., Zuni, supra note 330, at 309.
348
See id;, Minzner, supra note 333, at 109; SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN
TRIBAL COURTS: THE COSTS OF SEPARATE JUSTICE 6 (1978); see also Kevin K. Washburn &
Chloe Thompson, A Legacy of Public Law 280: Comparing and Contrasting Minnesota’s
New Rule for the Recognition of Tribal Court Judgments with the Recent Arizona Rule, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 479, 522 (2004); ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW:
NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 343 (rev. 4th ed. 2003) (describing the
“growing trend in Indian country favoring greater separation of powers”).
349
See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978)); Elizabeth Ann Kronk,
Promoting Tribal Self-Determination in a Post-Oliphant World: An Alternative Road Map,
FED. LAW., Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 41, 45–46. At least one scholar has pointed out that
judicial independence is a Euro-American notion that may not be equally valued by
Indians or all tribes. See Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through
Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 280 (1997) (“The concept of involving uninterested
third parties to impose a solution on the parties if they fail to reach a settlement is
another aspect of the American legal system that tears at the fabric of tribal
societies.”).
350
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of tribal enrollment decisions. Consequently, the main complaint
against tribal sovereignty over membership decisions would be
353
silenced.
Convincing tribes to participate in such a system and to permit
intertribal courts to have jurisdiction to decide enrollment disputes is a
critical first step. An obvious incentive for the tribes is avoiding
congressional abrogation of tribal sovereignty over membership disputes.
If tribes fail to respond to their critics’ complaints, they risk federal
intervention if the cries of disaffected or ousted members convince
Congress or the courts to take action. As already discussed, Congress’s
intent in passing ICRA was to secure individual rights of tribal members
354
against overreaching by tribal government. To the extent membership
decisions are viewed as running afoul of individual rights, the risk of
congressional intervention is very real and would cost much in terms of
sovereignty.
It would be wrong to suggest, however, that tribes do not have their
own inherent incentives to find a solution to this impasse. While gaming
revenue could, of course, create a disincentive to enact any meaningful
reforms, demographic realities likely provide countervailing incentives to
the tribes to be fair in their dealings with members and prospective
355
members. Specifically, if tribes continue to adhere to overly strict
membership criteria, they will further shrink their population and
political base, undermining recent gains and weakening their ability to
356
perpetuate their own cultures. Further, to the extent federal benefits
are tied to tribal population, there exists a reason for the tribe to expand
357
its membership base to receive more funding. More simply, tribal
members may wish to relax membership criteria to ensure that gaming
358
revenues pass onto their own offspring and descendants.
Even assuming tribal leaders wish to exclude newcomers and to
prevent diminishing their share of the gaming revenues, they face the
reality that by defining membership too narrowly, their own children may
be swept out of the tribe and that they may very well define the tribe out
359
of existence. This is particularly true given the reality that many Indians
marry outside their tribe, making it increasingly unlikely that even “half
blood” Indians will remain a significant percentage of tribal
360
Thus, tribes face competing priorities—protecting
populations.
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resources and revenues for current members without so narrowly
361
defining membership that they kill off the tribe itself. An independent
appellate system could assist in balancing these priorities, leading to a
greater perception of fairness and due process, and thus, legitimacy of
tribal membership decisions.
For such a system to work, it would require that tribes waive their
immunity so that the appeals court would have authority to review
362
membership decisions. Doing so would ensure that such decisionmaking stays in tribal hands by addressing the main concern of those
rallying for change—the lack of independent decision makers. It would
also ensure that the system helps preserve, rather than usurp, tribal
sovereignty by requiring tribal consent and participation in the
363
development of the court.
Indeed, the creation of an intertribal appellate court system would
not require a change to any existing tribal government or court
364
structure. Instead, it would provide an external layer of review in
365
addition to whatever court system the tribe currently possessed. In fact,
the structure of the court would be in tribal hands, ensuring continued
tribal autonomy and sovereignty over its courts and membership decision
366
making process. Further, decisions would be based on tribal law, tribal
367
culture, and traditions. This would be possible because such a court
368
system would be created, staffed, and operated by the tribes themselves.
Consequently, such a court system would have a level of cultural
awareness lacking in federal court adjudications of claims involving
369
membership disputes.
The importance of this cultural awareness cannot be overstated. The
goal of any intertribal court of review would have to be preservation of
the tribes’ right to determine their own membership based on tribal
361

See Goldberg, supra note 19, at 453; Neath, supra note 71, at 698.
See generally Struve, supra note 228.
363
See Zuni, supra note 330, at 309–11 (discussing the structure of and tribal
membership in the Southwest Intertribal Court of Appeals).
364
See generally id.
365
See id. at 310.
366
See id. at 309–11.
367
See id. at 312.
368
See id.
369
But see Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 55, at 49 n.75. There, the authors
suggest that reliance on tribal law, culture, and traditions would hamper intertribal
appellate panels because such panels would be required to learn about the law,
culture, and tradition of the particular tribe implicated in an appeal through
testimony of various tribal leaders. Id. However, the same would also be true of any
federal court reviewing tribal court decisions. The only solution to avoid the necessity
of such testimony would be the complete abrogation of tribal authority over
membership decisions, which would thereby make tribal law irrelevant to such
decisions. That solution is not acceptable for the reasons discussed above. See supra
Part IV.A; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978) (“A
tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been
recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community.”).
362

352

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1
370

values rather than outsider values being imposed on them. However,
any intertribal court system would have to interpret laws and customs
from various tribes with differing legal codes and traditions. But, because
these courts would grow out of the tribes themselves, they would be
better positioned than the state or federal courts to appreciate and
371
consider these differences. Indeed, given the diversity between 564
tribes, it is nearly impossible for there to be one federal solution,
372
particularly given the competing interests in enrollment decisions. A
court system designed by the tribes could account for this diversity by
organizing it so that tribes with similar histories or cultures are grouped
together. Further, because one court would not be charged with
reviewing decisions from all tribal courts, each court would have
oversight over fewer tribes, reducing the complexity that would be a
natural consequence if federal courts were involved.
In short, by forestalling critics’ main objection about a lack of
independent review of enrollment decisions, an intertribal appellate
court would ensure continued tribal control over membership decision
making. Such control is essential as an assertion of tribal sovereignty itself
and to ensure that tribal law and culture is what ultimately determines
enrollment decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the increased stakes of tribal membership often meaning the
difference between a life of abject poverty and a life of riches, Congress
or the courts may be moved to rethink its commitment to the principles
of Santa Clara. It is undeniable that the individual stories of those ousted
from their tribes or denied membership are troubling on many levels.
Nevertheless, the underlying premise of the Santa Clara decision—that
the ability of a tribe to define its own membership lies at the heart of its
existence as an independent political community—remains as appealing
today as it did more than thirty years ago. Indeed, tribal sovereignty may
be more relevant today when tribes are grappling with the impact of
gaming on their economies and citizenry. Rather than focus on
individual decisions, however troubling they may be, it is far more
constructive and less damaging to tribal sovereignty to craft a solution
370
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that protects both tribal sovereignty and tribal members. By providing for
independent oversight of their membership decisions, tribes would
silence their critics by increasing the perception that they are dealing
fairly with their members and those who claim membership. Through
building an independent appellate court system, tribes would ensure that
their members come to tribal—rather than federal—courts to resolve
membership disputes.

